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BLANC  MONT 

(MEUSE-ARGONNE-CHAMPAGNE) 


Monograph  No.  9        .^?^^^  \r  ^' 


Prepared  in  the 

Historiczi!  Branch,  War  Plans  Division 

,  General  Staif 


June,  1921 


WASHINGTON 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1922 


Wat?  DEPARTifENT 

\  '      i)0c:ulri&]utNo.*1010      : 
Omcc  of  The  Adjuiaiii  Generai 


& 


WAK  DEPAETMENT, 

Washington,  April  12^  1920. 

The  following  monograph,  entitled  "  Blanc  Mont  (Meuse-Argonne- 
Champagne) ,"  prepared  in  the  Historical  Branch,  War  Plans  Divi- 
sion, General  Staff,  is  approved  and  published  for  the  information  of 
all  concerned. 

[062.1,  A.  G.  O.] 

By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War  : 

PEYTON  C.  MARCH, 

General^  Chief  of  Staff. 
Official  : 

P.  C.  HAEUIS, 

The  Adjutant  General. 


'■-3172 


GENERAL  SCHEME  OF  MONOGRAPHS,  HISTORICAL  BRANCH. 


(Where  a  title  is  given  without  special  mark,  the  monograph  is  contemplated  or  in 
preparation;  a  title  with  a  single  *  indicates  a  monograph  completed  and  awaiting 
publication;  a  title  with  two  **  indicates  a  published  monograph.) 
I.  Narrative  History  of  Military  Operations. 

TheMajorOperationsof  the  A.  E.F.     (G.  O.  83,  W.  D.,  1919.)    H.  B.  Mono- 
graph No.  17. 
*"Cambrai."     H.  B.  Monograph  No.  5,  W.  D.  Doc.  1017,  1920. 

"Somme  Defensive  and  Lys." 
*"  Aisne  and  Montdidier-Noyon."     H.  B.  Monograph  No.  13. 
"Champagne-Marne  and  Aisne-Marne."     H.  B.  Monograph  No.  14. 

(a)  "The  3d  Division  on  the  Marne."     H.  B.  Monograph  No.  15. 
"Somme  Offensive,  Oise-Aisne,  Ypres-Lys." 

**(a)  "Operations  2d  Corps  in  Somme  Offensive."    11.  B.  Mono- 
graph No.  10,  W.  D.  Doc.  1016,  1920. 
"  St.  Mihiel."    H.  B.  Monograph  No.  12. 
' '  Meuse- Argonne . ' ' 
**" Blanc  Mont  (Meuse- Argonne-Champagne)."     H.  B.  Monograph  No. 
9,  W.  D.  Doc.  1010,  1920. 
"Vittorio-Veneto." 

*  ' '  Operations  in  North  Eussia,  1918- 1919."     II.  B.  Monograph  No.  11. 
"  Operations  in  Siberia,  1917-1920." 

"  Operations  in  Italy,  1917-1918." 
II.  Studies  of  Services  of  Supply. 

** ' '  Organization  of  Services  of  Supply,  A.  E.  F."    H.  B.  Monograph  No.  7, 
W.  D.  Doc.  1009,  1920. 
"Replacement  of  Personnel,  A.  E.  F."     II.  B.  Monograph  No.  8. 
"  Procurement  of  Supplies,  A.  E.  F." 
"  Initial  Equipment  and  Supply,  A.  E.  F." 
III.  Special  Tactical  Studies. 

*-■•  "A  Survey  of  German  Tactics,  1918."    II.  B.  Moncgi-aph  No.  1,  W.  D. 

Doc.  No.  883,  1918. 
**  "A  Study  in  Troop  Frontage."     H.  B.  Monograph  No.  4,  W.  D.  Doc.  No. 

992,  1919. 
**"A  Study  in  Battle  Formation."    H.  B.  Monograph  No.  6,  W.  D.  Doc. 
No.  1012,  1920. 
IV.  Military  Activities  in  ths  United  States. 

**"  Economic  Mobilization  in  the  United   States  for  the  War  of  1917." 

H.  B.  Monograph  No.  2,  W.  D.  Doc.  No.  885,  1918. 
**  "A  Handbook  of  Economic  Agencies  of  the  War  of  1917."     H.  B.  Mono- 
graph No.  3,  W.  D.  Doc.  No.  908,  1919. 

*  "  The  Signal  Corps  and  Air  Ser\dce:  A  Study  of  their  Expansion  in  the 

United  States,  1917-1918."     H.  B.  Monograph  No.  16. 
V.  Histories  of  Troop  Units. 

*  "Outlines  of  Histories  of  Divisions." 
** ' '  Outline  History  of  Regiments." 
4 


BLANC  MONT. 

OPERATIONS  OF  THE  2D  AND  36TH  DIVISIONS  WITH  THE  FOURTH 
FRENCH  ARMY  IN  CHAMPAGNE  IN  OCTOBER,  1918. 

[Map  iot'osif  herewith;  for  greater  detail  see  Tahure,  Attigny  and  Ste.  Mane  sheets,  ■rrrlsTsis-l 

-The  Blanc  Mont  operation  is  classed  by  the  Americans 
as  a  part  of  the  Meuse-Argonne  offensive,  but  in  a 
broader  sense  it  was  a  part  of  the  general  offensive  that 
extended  along  the  entire  front  of  the  Allied  Armies  be- 
tween Switzerland  and  the  English  Channel.  All  of  the 
armies  were  engaged  in  a  converging  attack— the  British 
toward  Cambrai,  the  French  east  and  west  of  Eeims  to- 
ward the  Aisne,  and  the  Americans  toward  Sedan  and 
Mczieres.  The  result  of  these  operations,  if  successful, 
would  be  to  clear  the  Germans  from  France  and  Bel- 
gium, prevent  the  withdrawal  of  a  large  part  of  them 
into  Germany,  and  also  prevent  the  removal  of  the  sup- 
plies accumulated  in  Belgium.  This  would  be  effected  by 
the  cutting  of  the  Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres  railway  sys- 
tem, and  the  cutting  or  threatening  of  the  northern  sys- 
tem through  Liege. 

Ihe  reduction  of  the  St.  Mihiel  salient  was  prelimi- 
nary to  the  main  operation,  which  commenced  on  Sep- 
tember 26.  In  the  main  operation  the  First  American 
Army  advanced  in  and  east  of  the  Argonne  forest.  The 
Fourth  French  Army,  in  whose  sector  the  Blanc  Mont 
operation  occurred,  advanced  west  of  the  forest.  Thus  a 
successful  advance  by  both  armies  would  lessen  German 
resistance  in  the  difficult  country  covered  b}''  the  woods. 

When  the  Germans  were  thrown  back  in  the  first  battlo 
of  the  Marne  in  1914,  the  line  stabilized  in  Champagne 
about  halfway  between  Souain  (5  kilometers  north  of 
Suippes)  and  Somme-Py.  It  passed  through  Navarin 
Farm  and  it  was  in  this  vicinity  that  the  21st  Corps  of 
the  Fourth  French  Army  attacked  when  the  Meuse-Ar- 
gonne operation  started  on  September  26. 

The  French,  prior  to  their  attack  in  this  quarter,  had 
called  upon  Gen.  Pershing  for  assistance,  and  the  orders 
transferring  the  two  divisions  that  later  on  participated 
in  it  were  issued  by  general  headquarters  on  Septem- 
ber 23. 


O  '  BLANC   MONT. 

Atfacking  September  26  on  the  Navarin  Farm  line,  the 
21st  French  Corps  had  succeeded  in  advancing  about  5 
kilometers,  forcing  the  Germans  to  abandon  their  succes- 
sive lines  until,  on  September  30,  the  latter  were  holding 
the  rearmost  line  of  the  main  position.    North  of  Somme- 

■■i.  Py  this  line  consisted  of  the  Prussian,  Elbe,  and  Essen 

trenches,  and  it  was  the  resistance  offered  by  these 
trenches  that  had  stopped  the  French  advance  when  the 
2d  American  Division  relieved  them  here  on  the  night 
of  October  1-2. 

^_0p.   Rpt.,   2a      The  2d  Division  had  participated  in  the  St.  Mihiel  of- 
fensive, September  12-15, 1918.    On  the  night  of  Septem- 
F.  o.  30,  2d  ber  15-16  the  division  marched  from  its  position  in  the 
front  line  of  the  Thiaucourt  sector  to  the  Ansauville- 
Royaumeix  area,  12  kilometers  north  of  Toul. 
Op.  Rpt.,  2d      Qn  September  20  and  21  the  division  marched  to  the 
F.  o.  31,  2d  vicinity  of  Toul,  where  it  reorganized  and  received  new 
clothing  and  equipment. 

,„Fye  ,,^°-  On  September  23  the  chief  of  staff,  First  Army,  sent  a 
telegram  to  the  2d  Division  informing  it  that  it  would 

loe'cV  ^G  H^Q  proceed  to  a  new  area,  and  on  the  same  date  issued  Special 

Order  285,  which  prescribed  the  details  of  the  move.    The 

p.  o.  32,  2d  movement  was  made  by  rail  (except  motor  transport  by 

marching)  starting  on  September  25  and  terminating  on 

File  No    102  September  28.     A  special  order.  Fourth  French  Army, 

o.  H.  Q.  directed  detrainment  near  Chalons,  where  the  division 

passed  into  the  reserve  of  the  Group  of  Armies  of  the 
Center  (G.  A.  C.) 

iAo^n<J*n  xj^R'  t)n  September  23  the  36th  Division,  which  was  under- 
going  training  in  the  Bar-sur-Aube  area  and  which  had 
not  yet  been  in  line,  was  notified  by  wire  from  First  Army 

ioi.oi.%,.  h^q!  headquarters  that  it  would  proceed  to  a  new  area,     Spe- 
op    Kpt..   2d  ci^l  Order  286  prescribed  the  details  of  the  movement, 

•^i^*  which  was  made  by  rail.    The  divisional  artillery  was  not 

serving  with  the  division  at  this  time  and  did  not  join  it 
until  after  the  armistice.  The  strength  of  the  36th  Divi- 
sion on  September  26  was  656  officers  and  15,590  enlisted. 
Besides  a  shortage  of  20  per  cent  in  strength,  there  was 
lacking  a  great  deal  of  equipment,  which  was  only  part- 
ially supplied  upon  the  arrival  of  the  division  in  the  bat- 
tle area.    The  movement  commenced  on  September  26  and 

DiT.'  ■  '  '  terminated  on  September  28.  The  division  then  occupied 
billets  south  of  the  Marne  River  between  Epernay  and 
Chalons,  where  it  formed  a  part  of  the  reserve  of  the 


BLAKC   MONT.  i 

French  Group  of  Armies  of  the  Center.    For  ^fUfposes  ot 
supply  it  was  attached  to  the  Fifth  French  Army. 

On  September  28  the  2d  Division  was  placed  in  the  re-  ^.f.  o.  33.  2d 
serve  of  the  Fourth  French  Army  and  on  September  28-     ^     „  ,     „^ 
30  moved  by  marching  and  trucks  to  the  Souain-Suippes  oiv. 
area,  10  kilom.eters  south  of  Somme-Py,  where  the  Fourth 
Army  was,  with  little  success,  attacking  the  German  line. 

On  October  1  orders  from  the  Fourth  French  Army  as-  p.^-  o.  34,  2d 
signed  the  2d  Division  to  the  21st  French  Corps,  and     ^^    ^^^^^  ^d 
orders  from  the  latter  directed  the  division  to  relieve  the  ^'*- 
61st  French  Division  in  the  front  line.    The  relief  was  ef- 
fected the  night  of  October  1-2.    The  4th  Brigade  (5th 
and  6th  Marines)  occupied  the  front  line  trenches  just 
north   of   Somme-Py  between   the   Boyau   de   Custrine 
(right)  and  Boyau  de  Bromberg  (left),  a  front  of  over  3 
kilometers.    The  5th  Marines  relieved  the  219th  and  265th 
French  Infantry ;  the  6th  Marines,  the  264th  French  In- 
fantry and  a  battalion  of  the  21st  French  Division  which 
was  on  the  left  of  the  61st  French  Division. 

The  formation  of  the  brigade  in  line  was  as  f oUoavs  : 

RIGHT. 


1st  Battalion  5th  Marines  and  Regi- 
mental Machine  Gun  Company. 

2d  Battalion  5th  Marines  and  23d 
Machine  Gun  Company. 

3d  Battalion  5th  Marines  and  77th 
Machine  Gun  Company. 


2d  Battalion  6th  Marines  and  81st 
Machine  Gun  Company. 

1st  Battalion  6th  Marines  and  Regi- 
mental Machine  Gun  Company. 

3d  Battalion  6th  Marines  and  15th  Ma- 
chine Gun  Company. 

The  front  line  lay  in  the  German  trenches  Pacha,  Elbe, 
and  Essen.  On  the  right  of  the  sector  the  4th  Brigade 
occupied  the  Essen  trench,  which  had  been  a  support 
trench  when  the  German  front  line  ran  through  Navarin 
Farm,  5  kilometers  to  the  south.  It  was  practically  the 
rearmost  trench  of  the  German  main  line,  the  next 
trenches  to  the  north  being  along  the  Blanc  Mont  ridge,  3 
kilometers  farther  back.  On  the  left  of  the  sector  west  of 
the  Boj^au  de  la  Pirna  the  Germans  still  occupied  the 
Essen  trench  to  include  a  bend  in  this  trench  half  a  kilom- 
eter to  the  west  of  the  American  boundary.  This  bend 
occupied  an  elevation  from  which  flanking  fire  was  de- 
livered on  the  Americans  in  their  initial  advance,  which 
greatly  retarded  the  operations  of  the  division.  It  was 
known  to  the  Americans  as  "  Essen  Hook." 

The  3d  Brigade  (9th  and  23d  Infantry)  was  placed  in 
reserve  south  of  the  Navarin  Farm  ridgev 


DlT, 


8  BLANC   MONT. 

F.  o.  34.  2d      The  artillery  of  the  61st  French  Division  remained  in 

Div.  '' 

u     R  t.    2d  pl''^'^'^-    The  2d  Field  Artillery  Brigade  moA'^ed  into  the 
D".  sector  October  1.    Both  came  under  the  2d  Division  when 

the  command  passed  at  8  a.  m.,  October  2. 

Divisional  headquarters  were  established  at  8  a.  m.,  Oc- 
tober 2,  in  a  dugout  (Wagram)  on  the  Souain-Somme-Py 
road  1  kilometer  north  of  Souain, 

The  relief  of  the  61st  French  Division  by  the  2d  Divi- 
sion was  made  on  verbal  orders,  the  written  orders  not 
arriving  at  4th  Brigade  headquarters  until  4.40  a.  m. — 
after  the  relief  was  effected. 

F.  0.  35,  2d      The  2d  Division,  after  taking  its  position  in  line,  was 
^^^'  the  left  (west)  division  of  the  21st  French  Corps.    The 

67th  French  Division  was  on  its  right  and  the  21st 
French  Division  on  its  left. 

Op.  Rpt.,  td  A  general  attack  had  been  contemplated  for  October 
2d,  but  it  was  postponed  until  the  3d,  and  the  day  of  the 
2d  and  the  night  of  the  2d-3d  was  devoted  to  clearing 

Op.  Rpt.,  4th  out  those  portions  of  Essen  trench  still  occupied  by  the 
^"^*  Germans.     This  was  accomplished  easily,  as  the  Ger- 

mans withdrew  from  the  front  of  the  4th  Brigade  during 
the  night,  allowing  the  5th  Marines  to  occupy  Essen 
trench  north  of  Somme-Py  without  difficulty,  while  the 
6th  Marines  lost  15  men  by  fire  from  Essen  Hook. 

p.  o.  35,  2d  Field  Orders  No.  35,  which  prescribed  the  attack  of 
the  2d  Division  on  October  3,  was  issued  at  11  p.  m. 
October  2.     The  proposed  plans  had  been  discussed  by 

Op.  upt.,  4th  the  division  and  brigade  commanders  the  afternoon  of 
®"*'  October  2.    The  written  order  did  not  reach  4th  Brigade 

headquarters  until  4.40  a.  m.  October  3,  and  the  com- 
manding officer  of  the  leading  battalion  of  the  6th  Ma- 
rines did  not  receive  his  copy  until  H  hour  and  did  not 
read  it  until  he  had  attained  his  objective. 
^^F.  0.  85,  2d  -pj^g  division  was  to  attack  with  both  brigades  in  line, 
3d  Brigade  and  3d  Battalion  French  tanks  on  right,  4th 
Brigade  and  2d  Battalion  French  tanks  on  left;  each 
brigade  in  column  of  regiments,  the  leading  regiment  in 
three  lines  of  one  battalion  each,  and  the  rear  regiment 
in  reserve.  The  division  objective  was  the  road  from 
Medeah  Farm  to  Blanc  Mont  (Hill  211,  3  km.  S.  W.) 
with  an  outpost  line  a  kilometer  in  advance  of  the  road.^ 

*  At  6.20  p.  m.,  October  2,  G-3,  2d  Division,  received  the  following  message  from  Lieut. 
White,  information  oflBcer  with  the  21st  French  Division :  *'  The  21st  Division  attacks  the 
enemy  on  its  front  to-morrow  at  5.30  a.  m.,  supported  by  tanks.  Its  immediate  objectives 
are  at  Elbe  trench  and  the  Essen  trench.  It  was  stopped  by  the  Essen  trench,  which  It 
has  been  attacking  to-day  •  •  *."  In  other  words,  the  objective  of  the  21st  French 
Division  was  2  kilometers  in  rear  of  the  objective  of  the  2d  Division. 


DlT, 


BLANC    MONT.  9 

The  2d  Field  Artillery  Brigade  assisted  by  the  artillery 
of  the  61st  French  Division  was  to  support  the  attack 
by  a  preparation  of  5  minutes,  a  creeping  barrage  to 
300  meters  beyond  the  objective,  a  standing  barrage  of 
30  minutes  on  this  line  after  the  arrival  of  the  left  bri- 
gade on  the  objective,  or  until  H  plus  2  hours  and  38 
minutes,  and  a  creeping  barrage  to  a  line  1,300  meters 
beyond  the  objective.  Here  the  barrage  was  to  rest  until 
the  Infantry  outpost  line  was  established.  The  252d 
French  Aviation  Squadron  was  attached  to  the  division. 

H  hour,  originally  set  for  6.30  a.  m.,  was  advanced  40     Memo.    Hdqt. 
minutes  and  the  troops  moved  out  at  5.50  a.  m.     The        ""  ^^  * 
artillery  preparation  was  made  15  minutes  longer  than 
originally  ordered,  or  20  minutes  in  all,  commencing  at 
5.30  a.  m. 

The  4th  Brigade's  parallel  of  departure  was  the  Essen  9p-  ^^^^  **^ 
trench,  which  it  was  already  occupying,  the  5th  Marines 
on  the  right  and  the  6th  Marines  on  the  left.  At  H  hour 
the  6th  Marines  were  to  advance  while  the  5th  Marines, 
waiting  until  the  6th  should  clear,  were  to  move  by  the 
left  flank  and  follow  in  their  rear  as  reserve. 

The  "jump  off"  was  a  much  more  difficult  matter  for  .op.  Bpt.,  ta 
the  3d  Brigade,  which  was  some  7  kilometers  in  rear  of 
its  designated  parallel  of  departure,  to  which  place  it  had 
to  proceed  by  a  night  march.  This  parallel,  which  was 
designated  as  "  Present  front  on  the  general  line :  03-1.0- 
Altona"  (across  main  road,  2  km.  N.  of  Somme-Py),  lay 
in  territory  still  in  the  enemj-'s  hands,  though  that  fact 
was  unknown  when  the  order  was  issued.    A  staff  officer    op.  Rpt.,  3 

3rig. 

of  the  ITOth  French  Division  had  j)romised  to  furnish 
guides  who  were  to  meet  the  brigade  near  Butte-de-Souain 
(in  the  Bois  du  Moineau  and  Clairiere  des  Aimees),  but 
these  guides  failed  to  appear.  The  result  of  this  was  that 
the  3d  Brigade  spent  most  of  the  night  of  October  2-3  in 
getting  to  the  position  from  which  the  attack  was  deliv- 
ered ;  and  when  it  finally  got  there,  it  was  not  the  position 
ordered  by  Field  Orders  No.  35.  but  one-half  a  kilometer 
in  rear  of  it,  north  of  the  Essen  trench  and  east  of  the 
Somme-Py— Medeah  Farm  road.  Most  of  the  brigade  ^^^"J^^p^^'^^^^ 
arrived  only  a  few  minutes  before  H  hour.  At  3.07  a.  m.  ^^^  'hl^ni^" 
October  3  the  chief  of  staff  received  the  following  mes- 1^^*^™''"^  °* 

_  to  Brig.    Gen.    Han- 

sage  from  Gen.  Ely,  commanding  the  3d  Brigade :  !°"  5  ^^'y-  ^^^ 

to  "^  '  to  to  Br.  Files. 

Units  in  place  as  follows:  Two  battalions  9th   in  comniunica-     Message,  EUy  to 
tion  with  other  battalion  of  9th.    Not  in  communication  with  23d. 
Guides  did  not  report  at  points  given  by  staff  officer  of  170th 
French  Division. 

85777"— 22 2 


10  BLANC   MONT. 

^History,  23d  The  23d  Infantry,  after  failing  to  find  the  guides  near 
the  Butte  de  Souain,  had  struck  out  across  country  in  an 
effort  to  reach  its  position.  Shortly  before  H  hour  offi- 
cers from  the  reconnaissance  party  located  the  regiment, 
and  at  H  hour  the  regimental  commander,  Col.  Stuart, 
reported  his  regiment  in  position  ready  to  advance. 
Di?.%d  and  /th  According  to  Field  Orders  No.  35,  the  right  of  the  4th 
Brigs.  Brigade  was  to  start  from  a  point  in  the  Essen  trench 

(82.81)   just  east  of  the  Somme-Py-St.  Etienne  road, 
Brfg.  ^'  ^^'  ^^  while  the  left  of  the  3d  Brigade  was  to  start  from 
"Altona,"  2  kilometers  to  the  northeast.     The  3d  Bri- 
gade really  started  from  a  line  one-half  kilometer  in 
"The  nature  of  Tear  of  the  ouc  indicated,  but  nevertheless  a  gap  of  over 
t'h i r°advantr-l^  a  Idlomcter  existed  between  the  two  brigades  who  were 
the'rVd^e  ^at^^an  to  converge  ou  the  objective.     This  might  have  proved  a 
«nt?aTing"on'^the  daugcrous  Operation  had  the  Germans  not  withdrawn 
mi'nT'of  Bnv  H^^ite  generally  from  the  front  of  the  2d  Division  before 
Siv!  "msr  Ir.  ^l^e  attack  started.     As  it  turned  out  the  two  brigades 
^*^^^-  joined  on  the  objective  and  the  Germans  who  remained 

in  the  pocket  were  captured. 
^^History,    23d      rjj^^  3^  Brigade  advanced  with  the  9th  Infantry  lead- 
op.  Rpt.,  3d  ing  and  the  23d  Infantry  in  reserve.    The  67th  French 
^"^'  Division  attacked  on  its  right.    The  first  objective,  the 

^Message,    Ely  ^^^^  ^^^^  Mcdeah  Farm  to  the  crossroads  2  kilometers 
to  the  southwest  (73.11)  was  taken  at  8.30  a.  m.  and  out- 
posts were  established  on  the  northern  slope  of  Blanc 
Mont-Medeah  Farm  ridge. 
matfoT^o'ffFce'r     The  67th  French  Division  on  the  right  connected  with 
"'"op.^^Rptr'sd  the  3d  Brigade  slightly  in  advance  of  Medeah  Farm,  its 
^"^'  line  including  Bois  du  Chien.    Connection  was  also  made 

with  the  Marines  on  the  left. 
Casualties  were  few. 

At  10.15  a.  m.  a  battalion  of  the  23d  Infantry  was 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  Ma j. Barker, of  the  5th  Marines, 
to  resist  a  counterattack.     This  attack  did  not  develop 
and  the  battalion  rejoined  its  regiment, 
to  Div!"coradr^^^      At  10.30  a.  m.  Gen.  Ely  reported  by  phone  to  G-3; 

Op.     Rpt.,    3d 

B«ig.  Third  Brigade  objective  reached  at  8.30  a.  m.  and  consoli.dated 

by  9th  Infantry.    A  battalion  of  23d  Infantry  sent  forward  about  1 
kilometer  as  outpost. 

When  the  2d  Division  entered  the  line  on  the  night  of 
October  1-2,  the  4th  Brigade  occupied  the  entire  front  of 
the  division  sector.  Field  Order  No.  35,  2d  Division, 
directed  the  attack  of  October  3  to  be  made  in  column  of 
re^jiments  in  each  brigade,  the  4th  Brigade  parallel  of 


BLANC   ^10:^-7.  11 

departure  to  extend  from  the  crossroads  (82.81),  1  kilo- 
meter northwest  of  Somme-Py,  to  the  Boyau  de  Bromberg. 
This  was  a  front  of  a  little  more  than  a  kilometer  and  lay 
in  the  sector  of  the  6th  Marines,  which  led  the  advance, 
followed  by  the  5th  Marines  in  reserve.  Each  regiment  ^^v-  spt-  it^ 
was  in  three  lines,  a  battalion  in  each  lijie  and  a  machine- 
gun  company  attached  to  each  battalion.  .  To  the  leading 
(2d)  battalion  of  the  6th  Marines  was  attached  a  French 
company  of  12  light  tanks  and  one  was  also  attached  to 
the  following  battalion  (1st). 

The  troops  advanced  at  5.30  a.  m.  and  at  8.30  were  on  Bri"^\^o^G^3  **** 
their  objective,  but  Blanc  Mont  itself  was  still  controlled 
by  the  Germans,  who  occupied  the  woods  on  the  western 
slope  and  had  not  been  dislodged.     This  territory  lay 
within  the  sector  of  the  French  who  were  still  south  of 
the  Elbe  and  Essen  trenches.    The  French  tanks  moved     Message,    ith 
forward  with  the  leading  battalions.    The  advance  was 
opposed  by  machine-gun  nests  in  front  and  in  the  tri- 
angular area  between  the  brigades,  which  space  had  not 
been  covered  in  the  attack.    It  was  later  cleaned  up  by  the  jeu"f  to^Eiy.  ^^ 
4th  Marines,  assisted  by  two  companies  of  the  3d  Brigade. 
Before  reaching  the  objective  the  1st  Battalion,  6th  Ma-  ^j^g^^'  ^ly  to 
rines,  came  up  on  the  right  of  the  leading   (2d)   bat- 
talion, and  both  advanced  together  to  the  objective.  Br?J!'  ^^*"  ^^^ 

The  greatest  obstacle  to  the  advance  of  the  4th  Brigade  „  9p-  ^p*-*  *"* 

C  _  '^  Brig. 

was  the  German  possession  of  Essen  Hook.  This  was  a 
system  of  trenches  and  dugouts  forming  a  part  of  the 
Elbe  and  Essen  line — the  rearmost  line  of  the  main  Ger- 
man position.  The  Hook  formed  a  bend  to  the  north  in 
the  line  and  was  located  on  a  hill  20  meters  above  the 
country  across  which  the  4th  Brigade  was  ordered  to 
advance  and  one-half  kilometer  to  the  west  of  its  sector. 
It  flanked  this  country  perfectly  and  the  left  of  each  ^op.  Rpt.,  4th 
battalion  suffered  from  the  machine  guns  located  on  the 
Hook.  The  French  had  unsuccessfully  attacked  this 
portion  of  the  line  on  October  2,  in  an  effort  to  expel  the 
Germans  from  Essen  trench.  On  October  3  the  21st  „.5"^'»=?'  "• 
French  Division  renewed  the  operation,  and  at  7.45  a.  m.  t'on  officer  with 

^  '  21st       Uir.,       to 

was  attacking  Essen  trench.     At  about  8.30  a.  m.  the  0-3. 

^  -»»•      1  Message,  White 

French  were  still  fighting  in  the    Saale  and   Mmden  to  g-s. 
trenches  just  south  and  west  of  Essen  Hook,  and  a  pla- 
toon of  the  5th  Marines  and  some  French  tanks  were  re- 

..  ,  p  1--.1T-V--'  Message,      4th 

ported  to  be  assisting  them  from  the  2d  Division  sector.  Brig,  to  c.  ot  s. 

The  platoon  of  the  5th  Marines  mentioned  above  was  p  ^f^unt^^^^*  |" 

in  reality  the  17th  Company,  5th  Marines,  reinforced  by  ture*^'of°"Esse^n 


12  BLANC   MONT. 

u**'c  ^j^Nor-  ^  section  from  the  8th  jSIachine  Gun  Company  and  a 
strand,  u.  s.  M.  37-millimeter  gun.  This  detachment  belonjred  to  the 
^^^-  1st  (rear)   Battalion  of  the  5th  Marines,  and  early  on 

October  3  was  ordered  to  clean  out  the  Hook  after  the 
i.t.  White  to  other  five  battalions  of  the  brigade  had  advanced  be- 
^^^-  yond  the  trenches.    The  Hook  was  captured  and  turned 

Maj.     Roberts,  ''  i        -r-.  i  i  •   i        i 

iniormation   offl-  over  to  the  1^  rencli,  alonor  with  about  100  prisoners,  be- 

cer,      with      4th  i     ,         n  i  .     .         ,    .        ,  ,. 

Brig.,  to  G-3.    fore  11  a.  m.  and  the  detachment  rejoined  its  battalion. 
Bruce,  "inf.,"  on      The  Frcncli  did  not  retain  possession  of  the  Hook,  and 
H^ic.'^^    "       *  the  Germans  reoccupied  it  the  afternoon  of  October  3. 
8.,"w*^DiT!J*  to      ^^  ^10  P-  ^-  the  chief  of  staff,  2d  Division,  informed 
Col.  Lay.  QqI  Lay,  information  officer  with  21st  French  Corps,  that 

the  2d  Division  was  under  artillery  fire  from  the  west  and 
that  the  21st  French  Division  had  not  advanced  beyond 
Essen  trench,  and  requested  that  orders  be  given  it  to  do 
so.  At  7.45  p.  m.  Lieut.  White  reports  the  21st  Division 
line  to  be  running  north  from  (and  including)  Essen 
Hook  to  some  patches  of  woods  one-half  kilometer  north- 
west of  the  Hook,  and  to  be  in  communication  with  the 
Americans  1  kilometer  north  of  the  Hook.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  the  French  line  did  not  include  Essen  Hook,  but 
ran  northwest  from  the  Hook  which  was  still  occupied  by 
the  Germans  the  night  of  October  3-4.  This  retarded  the 
operations  of  the  4th  Brigade  on  October  3,  and  enabled 
the  Germans  to  cling  to  the  western  slopes  of  Blanc  Mont, 
from  which  the  4th  Brigade  had  to  dislodge  them  on  Oc- 
tober 4 ;  from  here  they  fell  back  to  the  St.  Etienne  line, 
where  they  made  a  second  stand  until  October  11. 
Message,    Coi.      ^hc  second  attack  on  the  afternoon  of  October  3  was 

Lay  to  C.  of  S., 

11.40  a.  m.  made  pursuant  to  instructions  from  Gen.  Naulin,  com- 
manding the  21st  Corps,  which  directed  the  2d  Division 
to  advance,  leaving  one  battalion  to  support  the  left. 
Gen.  Naulin  then  knew  that  the  2d  Division  had  gained 

whitTtrh-3."'  ^ts  first  objective.    A  message  to  the  2d  Division  from  the 

information  officer  with  the  21st  French  Division  at  11.20 

a.  m.  stated  that  the  latter  division  had  taken  the  German 

trenches  in  its  front  and  was  advancing  northward. 

F.  o.  S6,  2d      The  attack  was  ordered  bv  Field  Order  36,  2d  Division, 

Div.  .  .  *^  .  '  ' 

issued  at  4  p.  m.,  which  prescribed  merely  that  the  two 
brigades  should  move  forward  from  their  present  posi- 
tions to  a  line  extending  from  the  road  fork  about  1  kil- 
ometer southwest  of  Scay  Farm  to  a  point  on  Blanc 
Mont-St.  Etienne  road  about  1  kilometer  south  of  St. 
Etienne,  tliere  to  establish  and  hold  a  line  of  resistance. 
The  2d  Field  Artillery  Brigade  was  to  support  the  move- 


BLANC    MONT.  13 

ment,  but  a  battalion  of  the  35th  French  Artillery  that  j^^f^^f*'  (.^^ 
supported  the  first  attack  was  withdrawn  from  the  con-  ^i^"''£^  through 
trol  of  the  2d  Division  during  the  second  attack  in  order 
to  assist  the  French  attack  against  Essen  trench. 

H  hour  was  given  as  4  p.  m.,  but  the  23d  Infantry,  ^9^-   ^p*-   '** 
which  made  the  attack  in  the  3d  Brigade  sector,  did  not     History,     23d 
pass  through  the  9th  Infantry  until  5  p.  m.  and  the  attack 
proper  was  made  by  the  1st  Battalion  at  6  p.  m.     Some     op.  Rpt.,   3d 
distance  was  gained  and  the  leading  battalion  reached    "  was  taken  by 

,,.,  T/>oj_-r-''  1  •  •     -I  of^der    of    the    3d 

the    high    ground   01    Ibt.    Ji,tienne,    where    it    occupied  Brigade  com- 

_,  •    1      1        1       n        1  1         mi   •  •    •  mandintc  officer  as 

a  salient  with  both  lianks  exposed,     ihis  position  was  Marine  Brigade 

,  .,-p,.         ,  ,  ,..,.  ,.  ,  was  held  up  and 

m  the  4th  Brigade  sector,  as  the  dividing  line  between  the  position  dom- 

!•         1  •  ji  i'TT'ii../->/i^  inated  the  Suippe 

brigades  ran  just  to  the  east  oi  Hill  159(160  on  2  o  ^o  o  o  rnap),  vaiiey."     state- 

,.,  ,ri-i  1  •]  '  ment    of    Brig'w 

which  was  the  high  ground  occupied.  Oen.    Hanson    E. 

In  the  4th  Brigade  the  advance  prescribed  by  Field  Fii4. 
Order  36  was  made  by  the  5th  Marines,  which  passed  Brig.' 
through  the  6th,  and  was  able  to  advance  only  about  Ih 
kilometers,  where  it  hung  on  under  fire.    Two  companies 
of  the  6th  Marines  were  ordered  up  to  protect  the  left 
flank. 

At  midnight  the  line  of  the  2d  Division  was  approxi- 
mately as  follows: 

The  9th  Infantry  on  the  road  from  Medeah  Farm 
to  the  crossroads  2  kilometers  to  the  southwest.  The  23d 
Infantry  between  this  road  and  the  hill  1  kilometer 
southeast  of  St.  Etienne.  The  leading  battalion  on  this 
hill  was  over  2  kilometers  in  advance  of  the  9th  Infantry 
and  not  in  communication  with  either  the  French  67th 
Division  on  the  right  or  the  4th  Brigade  on  the  left.  The 
5th  Marines  a  little  north  of  the  Blanc  Mont  ridge  road 
northeast  of  Blanc  Mont,  The  6th  Marines  south  of  the 
Blanc  Mont  ridge  road.  The  left  of  the  4th  Brigade 
line  was  refused  because  of  the  Germans  still  on  the 
western  slopes  of  Blanc  Mont, 

The  area  occupied  by  the  Infantry  was  a  triangle,  its  of  "Brigade  com! 
base  a  line  from  Medeah  Farm  to  the  southeastern  slope  ^^'^"e'^";  mak^'a 
of  Blanc  Mont,  and  its  apex  the  hill  1  kilometer  south-  br°oiden*"*^  stat^ 
east  of  St.  Etienne.  The  difficulty  of  this  position  is  cen."  Ha°4on "I: 
evident,  as  on  the  right  the  French  had  not  advanced  as  p|[^_  ^^^^  ^'' 
far  as  Medeah  Farm  and  on  the  left  they  were  still 
south  of  Blanc  Mont, 

On  October  3  the  36th  Division  was  transferred  from     t  e  1  e  g  r »  m 

,  ,.     ,        /^  ^    A  •  ,.     ,        .-,  ,        7364-B,  G.  A.  C. 

the  reserve  01  the  (jrroup  of  Armies  of  the  Center  to  the 
reserve  of  the  Fourth  French  Army  effective  on  Octo- 
ber 4. 


14  BLANC   MONT. 

^F.  o.  2,  ««th      Qyi  the  night  October  4-5  the  7lst  Infantry  Brigade 

and  the  111th  Field  Signal  Battalion  were  transferred  by 

truck  from  the  region  Tours-sur-Marne  to  the  Suippes- 

Somme-Suippe  area. 

F.  0.  37,  2d      Field  Order  37,  2d  Division,  issued  at  6  a.  m.  October 

Div.  .  . 

4,  directed  a  resumption  of  the  advance  to  the  north. 
Memo.,    Rhea  The  designation  of  H  hour  was  postponed  until  aero- 

^  m,^'^'  ^^'^^  planes  should  report  as  to  the  position  of  the  divisions 
on  the  flanks — whether  or  not  these  divisions  were 
abreast  of  the  2d  Division. 

in?^^*°'^'  ^^^  ^^  daybreak  October  4,  the  Germans  counterattacked 
the  23d  Infantry  in  its  advanced  position  and  were  re- 
pulsed. This  regiment  also  suffered  considerably  from 
fire  in  the  rear,  from  machine  guns  that  had  been  passed 
by  during  its  advance  of  the  previous  evening  or  that 
had  slipped  through  the  line.  At  2  p.  m.  the  1st  Bat- 
talion was  holding  the  front  in  some  old  German 
trenches  southeast  of  St.  Etienne  while  the  3d  Battalion 
and  a  j)art  of  the  2d  were  protecting  the  flanks.  Con- 
nection with  the  67th  French  Division  on  the  right  had 
Message.    4th  j^ot  been   established,  but  the   5th  Marines  advancing 

Brig,  to  G— 3.  '  ^ 

along  the  Somme-Py-St.  Etienne  road  north  of  Blanc 
Mont  during  the  morning  had  relieved  the  situation  on 
that  flank. 

During  the  night  October  3-4  the  22d  French  Division 

relieved  the  21st  French  Division  south  of  Blanc  Mont. 

The  22d  Division  advanced  the  morning  of  October  4 

Message,  Aero,  along  the  Bovaux  Bevreutli  and  Nuremberg:  it  did  not 

Squad.   27  to  C.  °  •  i  c  V,  i  n  r 

G.,  2d  Div.         take  as  its  objective  the  western  slopes  oi  Blanc  Mont, 

which  were  still   occupied  by  the   Germans,  but  bore 

away  toward  the  northwest.     At  about  10  a.  m.  a  bat- 

Message,    22d  taliou  of  the  22d  Division  was  arriving  at  the  St.  Pierre- 

Div.  to  G-3.  ^ 

St.  Etienne  road,  and  other  French  troops  were  ap- 
proaching the  Arnes  River  to  the  northwest  of  St.  Pierre. 
Thus  the  advance  of  this  division  did  not  immediately 
relieve  the  situation  on  the  left  flank  of  the  4th  Brigade, 
although  it  undoubtedly  made  the  Germans  on  Blanc 
Mont  apprehensive,  as  they  were  now  occupying  a  salient 
position,  and  this  made  the  final  operations  against  the 
hill  much  easier  for  the  4th  Brigade. 
Mwsage,  Aero,      rjpj     gj^j^  French  Division  on  the  right  of  the  3d  Bri- 

Bquad.      27,      to  ^     /-^        i  i 

°-3-  gade    also    advanced   the   morning   of    Octooer   4,    but 

to  ^(^3^=^'    ^^^  was  stopped  before  noon  on  the  line  Orf euil-Bemont 

Chateau.    This  division  seems  to  have  been  in  communi- 


BLANC   MONT.  15 

cation  with  the  9th  Infantry,  near  Medeah  Farm,  but  not  tion' SthTh 'iS- 

Avith  the  23cl  Infantry  in  itfi  advanced  position.  E^' Taced*  "Te^ 

At  about  12.30  p.  m.  the  division  commander,  2d  Divi-  pj*^"^',*,  ^"gtate- 

sion,  designated  H  hour  as  2.30  p.  m.    The  1st  Battalion,  ??«"*  °'  ^"f- 

■  t5  1  7  Gen.    Hanson    E. 

23d  Infantry,  which  was  occupying  a  salient  position  j}y^^   Hist.  Br. 
southeast  of   St.   Etienne,  advanced  toward   the   ridge     Message,    g-s 
northeast  of  the  village.    This  attack  was  not  supported     op.  Rpt.,  sd 
on  either  flank,  as  the  4th  Brigade  did  not  advance  at     History,    23d 
all,  and  the  French   67th   Division,  fighting  south  of 
Bemont  Chateau,  was  too  far  away  to  render  assistance.  g^J!'  ^p*"  **^ 
The  attacking  waves  came  immediately  under  heavy  ma-     History,    23d 
chine-gun  fire  as  well  as  a  counter  barrage.     Casualties  ^^ 
were  numerous,  the  battalion  commander  was  killed,  and 
after  an  advance  of  only  300  yards,  the  battalion  with- 
drew  to   its   former   position   in  the   German   trenches 
southeast  of  St.  Etienne. 

The  attack  ordered  by  Field  Order  37,  2d  Division, 
for  October  4  was  not  carried  out  by  the  4th  Brigade  ^^-  ^pt.,  4th 
because  "  it  was  considered  inadvisable  to  advance  leav- 
ing the  machine-gun  nests  on  the  western  slopes  of  Blanc 
Mont  intact."  Some  operations  were  undertaken  against 
these  nests  without  much  success.  The  4th  Brigade  com-  g^g-  «?*••  <*•> 
mander  reports  that  they  were  reconnoitered  the  after- 
noon of  October  4  and  unsuccessfully  attacked  during 
the  evening.  The  reconnaissance  evidently  involved 
some  hard  fighting.    At  2.20  p.  m.  the  regimental  com-  ,  Message,     Fe- 

-XT       •  1       11         1  It  ^^^^  **'   Lejeune. 

mander,  5th  Marines,  reports  "Marines  badly  shot  up 

and  requests  artillery  fire  north  of  Blanc  Mont.    At  2.40     Message,  Adjt. 

.  1       T-.    •  1  T%  r       •  1      1  1   ^^''^  ^■'»S-  to  G-3. 

p.  m.  the  adjutant,  4th  Brigade,  reports  Marines  held 
up  by  fire  from  east  end  of  Blanc  Mont,  and  at  3.05  p.  m. 
the  division  information  officer  with  the  4th  Brigade  re-     Message,   Maj. 

a  Til  HIT       J.  I^oberts   to   G-3. 

ports  that  machine-gun  nests  on  west  end  ox  Blanc  Mont 
are  causing  heavy  casualties  in  4th  Brigade. 

At  3  p.  m.  the  chief  of  staff,  2d  Division,  informed    Message,  Myers 

G-3,  21st  French  Corps,  that  the  2d  Division  was  unable  corps. 

to  advance  because  the  divisions  on  its  flanks  had  failed 
to  keep  abreast,  and  that  the  22d  French  Division  on  the 
left  had  advanced  west  instead  of  north.  He  also  told 
him  that  the  2d  Division  could  not  maintain  its  position 
north  of  Blanc -Mont  and  Medeah  Farm,  unless  its  flanks 
were  covered. 


Late  in  the  afternoon,  hoy\'ever,  the  situation  on  the  3rig!^to^fr 


4th 


G-3. 


'western  slopes  of  Blanc  Mont  eased  up  somewhat.    At  4 

p.  m.  the  resistance  there  had  ceased  and  the  6th  Marines  Brig??!  a-3. 


16  BLANC   MONT. 

"u-ere  advancing,  having  cleaned  up  the  machine  guns. 
In  this  the  17th  French  Infantry  assisted. 

Eihg^\^^a-3.^^'  At  9.05  p.  m.  the  regimental  commander,  6th  Marines, 
reports  a  gap  of  400  to  500  yards  between  his  regiment 

sw^trro^G-3."'  and  the  22d  French  Division,  and  the  information  officer 
with  the  22d  Division  reports  that  at  5.40  p.  m.  the  di- 
vision is  in  communication  with  the  Marines  at  a  point 
400  meters  north  of  Blanc  Mont. 

At  midnight  October  4,  the  situation  in  the  3d  Bri- 
gade was  practically  the  same  as  on  October  3.  In  the 
4th  Brigade,  the  5th  Marines  were  still  on  the  Blanc 
Mont-Medeah  Farm  ridge,  their  right  near  the  cross 
roads  on  the  Somme-Py-St.  Etienne  road  and  their  left 
refused  so  as  to  face  the  eastern  slopes  of  Blanc  Mont. 
The  6th  Marines  had  passed  Blanc  Mont  and  were  in 
communication  with  the  22d  French  Division,  which  was 
near  St.  Pierre.  The  Germans  still  held  the  crest  and 
eastern  slopes  of  Blanc  Mont,  but  they  were  practically 

23d"S.^^to*G-3'.  surrounded  there.  They  held  St.  Etienne,  whence  they 
had  driven  back  patrols  of  the  23d  Infantry.  In  the 
front  of  the  2d  Division  the  Germans  were  holding  a  line 
from  St.  Etienne  through  the  cemetery  to  the  east. 
Message,  21st  At  11  p.  m.  the  3d  Battalion,  341st  French  Field  Artil- 
lery, was  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  2d  Division. 
F.  o.  38.  2d      Field  Order  No.  38,  2d  Division,  issued  at  4  a.  m.  Octo- 

Div.  .  ...  .  . 

ber  5,  directed  the  division  to  continue  its  advance  toward 
Telephone  mes-  tlic  samc  objcctive  giveu  in  Field  Order  No.  37 — Ma- 
Eiy.'  chault-Cauroy.     H   hour  was  not  given,   and   at  9.05 

a.  m.  the  division  commander,  in  a  telephone  conver- 
sation with  the  commander  of  the  3d  Brigade,  said 
"  H  hour  will  not  be  given."  In  the  same  conversation 
he  describes  the  cleaning  up  of  Blanc  Mont,  and  says 
that  all  the  2d  Division  will  do  on  October  5  will  be  to 
keep  abreast  of  the  French  divisions  on  the  flanks — that 
no  formal  attacks  will  take  place.  Thus,  Field  Order 
History,  23d  j^q.  38  was  practically  revoked  as  far  as  the  3d  Brigade 
Message,    Ely  ^^g  concemed.    The  23d  Infantry  made  no  attempt  to 

to  2d  F.  A.  Brig.  *'  t    t-»    •  i 

Telephone  mes-  advaucc.    At  3.40  p.  m.  the  line  of  the  3d  Brigade  ex- 
sage,  C.  of  S.  to  -^  P    o        T-i    • 

c.  0.   6th  Ma-  tended  from   1  kilometer  southeast  of  St.  Etienne  to 


nnes. 


southeast  of  Medeah  Farm,  practically  the  same  as  on 

October  4.     The  23d  Infantry  was  still  occupying  the 

right  of  the  4th  Brigade's  sector  at  4.05  p.  m. 

Message,  0.  0.      At  6.15  a.  m.  October  5  the  3d  Battalion,  6th  Marines, 

0-8.    *""^*    °  attacked  the  German  machine  guns  on  Blanc  Mont  and. 


BLANC   MONT.  17 

with  no  casualties,  carried  the  hill  and  captured  209  BrtJ't^^o^s/"' 

prisoners,  besides  much  materiel,  'including  75  machine 

guns  and  trench  mortars.    The  bloodless  character  of  this  Brigfto^fr-3,  * 

enterprise  was  due  to  the  efficient  artillery  preparation 

bv  the  2d  Field  Artillery  Brigade.     This  operation  was     Memo.,  2d  f. 

*^  .  ■  /^     1        ^'    ^rig.    to    O. 

preliminary  to  the  advance  prescribed  by  Field  Order  of  s. 
No.  38,  the  provisions  of  which  could  not  have  been  car- 
ried out  as  long  as  the  Germans  occupied  Blanc  Mont. 

The  operation  report  of  the  4th  Brigade  states  that  3^.°|-  ^p'-  ^^^ 
pursuant  to  Field  Order  No.  38  the  4th  Brigade  attacked 
in  the  direction  Machault-Cauroy  on  the  afternoon  of 
October  5.  The  6th  Marines  passed  through  the  5th 
Marines,  the  2d  Battalion  leading,  and  the  attack  was 
stopped  by  machine-gun  fire  2  kilometers  southeast  of  St. 
Etienne,  where  the  troops  dug  in.  The  records  do  not 
show  that  H  hour  was  designated  to  the  4th  Brigade,  and 
it  is  probable  that  this  movement  was  in  line  with  Gen. 
Lejeune's  intention  not  to  make  any  formal  attacks  on 
October  5,  but  merely  to  keep  his  line  abreast  of  the 
French  divisions  on  the  flanks.  This  advance  relieved 
the  situation  on  the  left  of  the  23d  Infantry,  which  had 
been  occupying  an  advanced  position,  partly  in  the  4th 
Brigade's  sector,  since  October  3. 

On  the  right  of  the  2d  Division  the  French  73d  Di-  on^^^'l^h  ^"rsd 
vision  attacked  at  5.15  a.  m.  October  5,  and  at  6.10  a.  m.  ^'^-  *°  ^^^ 
had  reached  Wallmiiller  Lager,  about  1  kilometer  north- 
east of  Medeah  Farm.     Here  it  was  stopped,  and  then ,  Jei.    message, 

'■  '-        '  Infor.      Off.      to 

fell  back  to  its  line  of  departure.    The  170th  French  Di-  g-3. 

vision  was  then  put  in  at  11  a.  m.,  evidently  without ,  ™-    "Jissage. 

^  .  ^,  .  Infor.       Off.       to 

success,  as  at  8.25  p.  m.  the  information  officer  with  the  g-s. 
French  reports  to  G-3  that  the  French  hope  for  success  „"«fsage,  infer. 

'-  '■      ,  Off.  to  G-3. 

and  will  do  their  best.    Gen.  Naulm,  commanding  the  21st 

Corps,  was  evidently  apprehensive  about  the  situation 

on  the  right  of  the  2d  Division.    In  a  message  to  Gen. 

Lejeune  at  12.40  p.  m.  he  tells  him  that  a  French  division 

had  been  ordered  to  send  assistance  to  the  73d  Di^dsion 

and  he  requests  the  2d  Division  not  to  hesitate  to  engage 

its  reserves  on  that  flank.    The  right  flank  of  the  3d  Bri-  to*info?.^off.?3d 

gade  was  still  resting  on  Medeah  Farm  the  evening  of  ^-  ''*^- 

October  5. 

On  the  left  of  the  2d  Division  the  French  situation  was  os*^"' wuh  ^"wd 
more  favorable.    The  22d  Division  advanced  with  little  ^^^-  *°  ^^• 
opposition  at  6  a.  m.,  and  at  10.55  a.  m.  had  reached  St. 
Pierre-a-Arnes,  its  right  extending  about  1  kilometer 

85777°— 22 3 


1  O  BLANC   MONT. 

i3frto^(>-3  ^^'  t^"^^rd  St.  Etienne.  This  it  was  able  to  do  because 
Blanc  'Mont  had  been  cleared  of  the  German  machine 

Lay^o*fr^3.  '  guns.  At  3.-10  p.  m.  St.  Etienne  was  eri\  neously  re- 
ported captured.  While  patrols  ma}'  have  entered  the 
western  part  of  the  village  on  October  5,  there  was 
Message,  G-3  fig-hting  back  and  forth  in  the  town  and  cemetery  on 
October  5,  6,  and  7,  and  the  place  was  not  definitely 

Message,  Infor.  . 

Off.  with  22d  taken  until  October  8.  However,  the  advance  of  the 
22d  Division  brought  the  French  line  abreast  of  the  2d 
Division  so  that  at  1.45  p.  m.  the  two  divisions  were  in 
communication  about  one-half  kilometer  south  of  St. 
Etienne. 

s.^o'Tfh'iE'  G.      ^t  3  P-  ^-  tbe  4th  Machine  Gun  Battalion,  until  then 

^"op.  Rpt,  4th  i^  reserve,  received  orders  to  report  to  the  3d  Brigade. 

M.  G.  Bn.  Company  B  was  sent  to  the  23d  Infantry  and  Company 

A  was  held  at  brigade  headquarters. 

The  line  of  the  3d  Brigade  was  unchanged  the  night 
of  October  5-6.  The  4th  Brigade  had  advanced  its  line 
so  that  it  connected  with  the  23d  Infantry  on  the  ridge 
southeast  of  St.  Etienne,  whence  it  extended  west  and 
connected  with  the  French  about  one-half  kilometer 
south  of  that  village. 

The  French  22d  Division  had  experienced  so  little 
opj)osition  in  its  advance  that  it  believed  the  same  condi- 
tions existed  on  the  2d  Division's  front.     The  118th 

t)if.*V3^G-z.^"'^  French  Infantry,  finding  nothing  in  front  of  it  to  the 
west  of  St.  Etienne,  sent  a  message  at  4.55  p.  m.  to  the 
2d  Di^dsion,  recommending  that  the  latter  advance  also, 
as  probably  little  resistance  would  be  met.  The  events 
of  October  6  and  7  were  to  prove  that  the  German  main 
effort  was  directed  against  the  2d  Division  front,  as  this 
division  was  the  most  dangerous  to  the  German  plan  of 
withdrawal. 

French ^Ar my"!      The  7lst  Infantry  Brigade  and  the  111th  Field  Signal 

®'^**  ^'  Battalion,  of  the  36th  American  Division,  were  placed  at 

co^s,°oct!  5.^^  *h®  disposal  of  the  21st  French  Corps  at  8  a.  m.  October 
5.     On  October  6,  they  were  placed  at  the  disposal  of 

sefh  Div^  '"*'  *'  the  2d  Division.  The  remainder  of  the  36th  Division 
(less  artillery)  was  on  October  6  and  7  moved  by  march- 
ing to  the  Suippes  area. 

Div.!'ppf'87-co!  The  36th  Division  during  its  operations  in  Cham- 
pagne was  short  a  large  amount  of  transportation.  This 
shortage  was  supplied  in  part  by  the  French  and  in  part 
by  the  2d  Division,  but  at  all  times  its  movements  were 
hampered. 


BLANC   MONT.  19 

On  October  6  the  only  fighting  consisted  of  small  local  ^Pp-  ^p*-  ^^ 
actions  in  which  the  line  was  slightly  advanced.  These 
local  actions  included  an  attack  at  6.30  a.  m.  by  the  3d  g^g;-  ^p*-  "'^ 
Battalion,  Gth  Marines,  on  machine-gun  nests  southeast 
of  St.  Etienne,  which  were  captured  at  9.30  a.  m.,  thus 
cleaning  up  the  country  south  of  the  St.  Etienne-Orfeuil  BrS?1o^G-3.**'' 
road.  The  23d  Infantrj'^  also  participated  in  this  attack, 
which  the  3d  Brigade  commander  states  was  necessary  uri^?*  ^^■'  '"^ 
because  during  the  attacks  on  October  3-5  a  part  of  the 
23d  Infantry  had  gotten  into  the  Marine  sector,  and 
when  moved  out  of  it  the  night  of  October  5-6  in  com- 
pliance with  division  orders,  the  vacated  space  was  not 
occupied  promptly  by  the  Marines;  the  Germans  there- 
fore came  back  and  delivered  flanking  fire  from  the  west 
on  the  3d  Brigade.  The  result  of  this  attack  was  to 
bring  the  front  of  the  2d  Division  up  to  the  general  line 
of  the  St.  Etienne-Orfeuil  road,  which  is  where  the  71st 
Brigade  relieved  it  the  night  of  October  6-7.  The  line 
was  not  continuous,  nor  were  the  troops  sheltered,  except 
in  shell  holes  or  fox  holes  made  by  the  men  themselves. 
Neither  did  it  follow  the  road  exactly,  but  departed  from 
it  at  places  by  several  hundred  meters.    On  the  right  the 

Elv   to    C     O 

line  connected  with  the  73d  French  Division  northwest  of  23d  inf. 

Medeah  Farm,  and  on  the  left  with  the  7th  French  Di-  oiv. ' 

vision  about  one-half  kilometer  south  of  St.  Etienne. 

The  Germans  still  occupied  the  cemetery  and  the  eastern 

part  of  St.  Etienne,  and  the  French  line  was  bent  around  jjg't'fnes^to  g^s! 

it  to  the  west  and  north. 

The  relief  of  the  front  line  of  the  2d  Division  by  the 
71st  Brigade  was  effected  the  night  of  October  6-7,  pur- 
suant to  Field  Order  No.  39,  2d  Division,  which  directed  ^f-  o.  39,  2d 
the  3d  and  4th  Brigades  to  leave  one  battalion  in  each 
brigade  sector  until  further  orders.  The  brigade  ma- 
chine-gun battalions,  the  Stokes  mortar,  and  the  37-milli- 
meter  detachments  were  to  remain  for  24  hours  with  the 
incoming  brigade.  Mortars  and  37-millimeter  guns  were 
to  be  turned  over  to  the  71st  Brigade  when  the  2d  Divi- 
sion personnel  withdrew. 

The  71st  Brigade,  which  had  had  a  difficult  march  on  History,  seth 
October  6  from  Somme-S'uijDpcs  to  south  of  Somme-Py, 
started  for  the  front  line  at  5.30  p.  m.  Guides  from  the 
2d  Division  were  to  have  met  it  in  Somme-Py,  but  some 
did  not  appear  and  those  that  did  were  not  well  ac- 
quainted with  the  country.     The  result  W'as  that  the 


Div. 


Uiv. 


20  BLAKG   MONT. 

^_op.  Rpt,  S6th  entire  ni<2:ht  was  spent  by  the  troops  in  marching  and 
countermarching  through  the  rough  country  between 
Somme-Py  and  the  front  line.  By  daylight,  however,  all 
troops  were  in  position  except  the  Headquarters  Com- 
pany of  the  142d  Infantry,  which  wandered  around  until 
afternoon, 
^^op.  Rpt.,  3d  xhe  141st  Infantry  relieved  the  23d  Infantry,  which 
withdrew  to  the  Pylone  Hill.  The  9th  Infantry  was  left 
in  line,  each  of  its  battalions  being  put  alongside  a  corre- 
sponding battalion  of  the  141st  Infantry,  which  had  its 
History,  36th  1st  Battalion  in  front,  2d  Battalion  in  support,  and  3d 
in  reserve.  The  142d  Infantry  relieved  the  6th  Marines, 
putting  its  2d  Battalion  in  front,  its  1st  in  support,  and 
its  3d  in  reserve.  The  6th  Marines  withdrew  to  Blanc 
Mont  ridge  and  the  5th  Marines  remained  in  support. 
History,  36th  Companies  B  and  C,  132d  Machine  Gun  Battalion,  were 
attached  to  the  141st  Infantry,  and  Companies  A  and  D 
to  the  142d  Infantry. 

The  commanding  general,  3d  Brigade,  retained  com- 
to  ™worth.^^^  mand  of  his  brigade  sector.  At  12.10  p.  m.  October  T 
he  informed  the  commanding  general,  71st  Brigade,  of 
that  fact  and  directed  that  the  sector,  which  included 
the  141st  Infantry,  be  extended  500  yards  to  the  right  so 
'  as  to  take  over  ground  held  by  the  French.  This  anoma- 
lous state  of  affairs  might  have  had  serious  consequences, 
but  it  does  not  seem  to  have  done  so. 

No  fighting  occurred  in  the  American  front  on  Oc- 
tober 7.    The  time  was  utilized  in  reorganizing  the  line 
with  the  71st  Brigade  in  the  front  line,  and  making  ar- 
rangements for  the  next  attack,  which  all  knew  to  be 
impending. 
Message,     Lt.      During  the  day  conflicting  reports  were  received  as  to 
the  possession  of  St.  Etienne  by  the  French.     The  in- 
Message,  Infer,  formation  officer  with  the  22d  French  Division  reports 
Brig,  to  G-3.      that  the  Germans  took  the  town  in  a  fog  at  6.20  a.  m.,  but 
that  the  French  recaptured  it  at  8.30.    The  town  is  re- 
ported to  be  occupied  hj  Germans  before  8.40  a.  m. 
Message,    4th  Thcsc  two  TBDorts  agree,  but  at  11.50  a.  m.  a  patrol  of  the 

Brig,  to  G-3.  ,      ,  r       •  n        -,  o  ^  ^ 

6th  Marines  was  fired  on  trom  cemetery  and  western 

Message,    6th  [eastcm?]  edge  of  the  town,  and  at  1.15  p.  m.  the  6th 

Marines  to  G-3.    ]yjj^j.- j^gg  reported  that  they  estimated  200  Germans  in  St. 

Etienne  and  more  coming  over  the  hill.    They  believed 

that  thg  Germans  were  trying  to  filter  into  the  town  and 

^  Message,  in^for.  ^^^-^^^  ^j^^  remaining  French  out.    The  21st  Corps  believed 

wTiv."  ^'  "^  ^'  that  the  French  held  the  town,  as  it  sent  two  messages 


BLANC   MONT.  21 

to  the  2d  Division  requesting  the  bitter  to  take  it  over. 
The  facts  are  that  the  Germans  held  tlie  cemetery  and 
tlie  greater  part  of  St.  Etienne,  while  the  French  had  a 
precarious  footing  in  the  western  part  of  it. 

During  the  afternoon  reports  were  received  that  the  G^2"to*G-3^^*" 
Germans  were  digging  in  1|  kilometers  northeast  of  St.     infor.  ofr.  with 
Etienne,  and  that  they  were  massing  in  the  woods  north-  ^^^  ^^^'  *°  ^'' 
east  of  the  town.     Also  that  their  heavy  artiller}'^  had 
been  ordered  back  and  that  the  infantry  was  to  make  a  Qia'tVa-s.^'^**' 
two  days'  stand.     There  was  every  indication  that  the 
Germans  intended  to  hold  on  a  line  running  from  St. 
Etienne  through  the  cemetery  and  thence  to  the  northeast 
along  the  ridge  toward  Semide. 

The  7th  French  Division  relieved  the  22d  on  the  left 
of  the  2d  Division  the  night  of  October  7-8. 

The  attack  of  October  8  was  made  pursuant  to  Field  „/•  ^-  *^'  *^ 
Order  No.  40,  2d  Division,^  which  prescribed  an  advance 
in  the  direction  Machault-Cauroy.  The  infantry  attack 
was  to  be  made  by  the  71st  Brigade  on  the  front  it  was 
occupying.  The  2d  Division  was  to  constitute  the  reserve 
and  furnish  the  troops  for  flank  protection  and  connec- 
tion with  the  adjacent  divisions.  Two  battalions  of 
I'rench  tanlvs  were  assigned  to  the  71st  Brigade.  The 
36th  Division  had  no  artillery,  and  the  2d  Field  Artiller}-  History,  stth 
Brigade  with  attached  French  artillery  (29tli,  341st, 
452d  F.  A.)  was  to  support  the  attack.  The  written 
order  was  issued  at  11  p.  m.  October  7,  but  on  the  after- 
noon of  the  7th  the  commanding  general  of  the  71st  Bri- 
gade was  summoned  to  the  2d  Division  headquarters, 
where  he  received  verbal  orders  for  the  attack. 

The  field  order  issued  by  the  71st  Brigade  for  the  at-  f-  o.  i,  7i»t 
tack  on  October  8  was  practically  a  copy  of  Field  Order 
No.  40,  2d  Division,^  except  that  the  tasks  of  the  two 
infantry  regiments  were  prescribed.  These  were  to  at- 
tack in  column  of  battalions,  which  were  to  "  leapfrog  " 
as  each  successive  objective  was  gained,  the  leading  bat- 
talion becoming  the  rear  battalion  after  the  first  objec- 
tive was  gained,  the  second  battalion  becoming  the  lead- 
ing one,  and  the  rear  one  becoming  the  second,  etc. 

'  In  the  records  of  the  36th  Division  this  order  appears  as  F.  O.  ZO.  The  2d  Division 
issued  two  field  orders  numbered  39,  and  subsequently  renurnhcred  the  second  one  "  40," 
but  this  change  was  not  made  in  the  copies  sent  to  the  oGth  Division. 

'  F.  O.  40,  2d  Division,  is  made  a  part  of  F.  O.  1,  71st  Brigade,  by  notations  such  as 
the  following  ;  "As  per  F.  O.  40,  Ileadciuarters  2d  Division  attached."  This  necessitated 
distributing  the  divisional  field  order  to  all  who  received  the  brigade  order,  which  is  not 
only  likely  to  be  confusing  but  dangerous  if  the  former  should  be  lost  or  not  received. 

85777°— 22 4 


22  BLANC   MONT. 

to^i^mpauy'r!      ^  Hour  Tvas  designated  as  5.15  a.  m. 

*^*  History    86th      "^^^^  Commanding  general,  71st  Brigade,  assembled  his 

^i'*  regimental  commanders  during  the  evening  of  October 

7,  discussed  the  plans  for  the  attack,  and  issued  a  warn- 
ing order.  He  dismissed  them  about  9  p.  m.  and  they  re- 
turned to  their  headquarters  and  assembled  the  battalion 
commanders,  who  after  receiving  their  orders  returned 
to  battalion  headquarters  and  assembled  the  company 
commanders.  All  orders  were  based  upon  the  verbal  in- 
structions given  to  Gen.  ^Vliitworth  at  2d  Division  head- 
quarters, as  Field  Order  No.  40  (with  a  memorandum 
giving  H  hour  attached)  did  not  reach  the  71st  Brigade 
until  after  midnight  and  Field  Order  No.  1,  71st  Brigade 
(with  Field  Order  No.  40  attached),  was  not  sent  out 
until  3  a.  m.  and  apparently  got  no  farther  than  regi- 
mental headquarters.  The  result  of  all  this  was  that  the 
company  commanders  received  verbal  orders  that  had 
been  four  times  verbally  transmitted,  those  of  the  141st 
Infantry  (except  Company  A)  receiving  them  between  1 
and  3  a.  m.,  while  the  142d  Infantry  did  not  receive  theirs 
until  about  5  a.  m.  H  hour  seems  to  have  reached  the 
troops  just  before  the  attack  was  to  start.  The  leading 
battalion  of  the  141st  Infantry  received  it  at  about  5.11 
a.  m.  The  battalion  commander  of  the  leading  battalion 
of  the  142d  Infantry  was  still  giving  his  instruction  to 
his  company  commanders  when  the  barrage  started. 
History,    86th     The  141st  Infantry  attacked  in  the  sector  formerly  oc- 

^^'  cupied  by  the  3d  Brigade  (right  of  the  division  sector). 

The  leading  battalion  (1st)  started  on  time,  and  imme- 
diately encountered  heavy  artillery  and  machine-gun 
fire.  The  battalion  commander  was  killed.  However, 
the  troops  advanced  a  short  distance  north  of  the  St. 
Etienne-Orfeuil  road,  where  they  were  definitely  stopped. 
The  2d  and  3d  Battalions,  141st  Infantry,  followed  the 
1st  in  the  order  named.  Neither  was  ready  to  move  at  H 
hour — the  2d  because  the  battalion  commander  decided  to 
shift  his  companies  in  line  at  the  last  moment,  and  the  3d 
because  of  the  failure  of  the  companies  to  receive  notifi- 
cation of  H  hour.  Both  battalions  soon  became  disor- 
ganized. However,  groups  of  them  kept  on  and  joined 
the  1st  Battalion,  north  of  the  St.  Etienne-Orfeuil  road. 
Here  the  regiment  hung  on  the  rest  of  the  day.  Company 
A,  141st  Infantry,  had  been  on  the  extreme  right  of  the 
battalion  sector  prior  to  the  attack  and  runners  with 


BLAIJ^C   MONT. 


23 


I 


orders  had  failed  to  reach  it.  Nevertheless,  it  advanced 
shortly  after  H  hour  also  to  a  position  north  of  the  St. 
Etienne-Orfeuil  road,  where  it  seems  to  have  formed 
some  kind  of  (lank  protection  for  the  advanced  elements 
of  the  regiment 

The  2d  Battalion,  9th  Infantry,  which  had  been  desig- 
nated to  connect  the  71st  Brigade  and  the  73d  French 
Division,  had   become  considerably  involved.     At  8.40  ^dnT^^oih^in?:. 
a.  m.  its  commanding  officer  reported  that  the  l-ilst  In-  to  c.  o.  9th  inK 
fantry  had  been  stopped,  that  his  losses  were  heavy,  and 
that  he  must  have  assistance,  and  at  9  a.  m.  he  asked  for 
relief.     The  French  73d  Division  is  reported  to  have  R.-Jf ^'^^3 '^'* 
advanced  and  then  retired  through  the  line  of  the  2d 
Battalion,  9th  Infantry.     This  report  is  not  substanti-  ^  MesMge,    Ely 

"^  .  ,  /Y>    •  1       *"  Lejeune. 

ated,  but  it  is  true  that  they  did  not  advance  suthciently 

to  better  conditions  on  the  right  of  the  71st  Brigade. 

At  11.14  a.  m.  the  information  officer  with  the  73d  Divi-  y^Y^li^^^l' ^f^ 

sion  reported  tliat  the  French  line  extended  west  from 

Bois  du  Coq,  which  would  be  a  prolongation  of  the  line  to 

which  the  fragments  of  the  141st  Infantry  were  clinging. 

At  2.40  p.  m.  the  commanding  officer,  1st  Battalion,  2d  Rn'^lngs^^to  a 
Engineers,  reported  to  his  regimental  comm.ander  that  *^-  ^d  Engrs. 
the  battalion  had  relieved  a  battalion  of  the  9th  Infantry 
and  stated  that  the  American  line  was  ahead  of  the 
French  line.  A  company  of  the  4th  Machine  Gun  Bat- 
talion was  also  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Engineer 
Battalion,  which  took  over  the  duties  of  flank  protec- 
tion and  connection  between  the  71st  Brigade  and  73d 
French  Division. 

A  battalion  of  French  tanks  was  assigned  to  the  141st  ^y^^'^^°^'   *""> 
Infantry.     The  following  report  as  to  their  operations 
is  an  extract  from  the  History  of  the  36th  Division : 

It  was  about  this  time  (6.30  a.  m.)  that  the  tanks  attached  to 
the  regiment  came  into  action.  *  *  *  Their  commanding;  offi- 
cer, however,  had  not  learned  the  time  of  H  hour,  as  the  runner 
who  was  sent  to  him  with  the  information  did  not  reach  his  post 
of  command.  In  consequence  the  tanl^s  did  not  begin  their 
advance  on  time  and  first  made  their  appearance  on  the  left  flank 
of  the  141st  Infantry  some  15  minutes  after  the  2d  Battalion  had 
started  the  assault.  They  seem  to  have  given  some  little  assist- 
ance to  various  detachments  of  the  2d  Battalion  as  it  came  for- 
ward, but  as  there  was  no  liai.son  between  the  infantry  and  the 
tanks,  and  as  the  latter  seemed  to  have  no  concerted  plan  of 
action,  their  assistance  was  negligible.  *  *  «  Worst  of  all, 
*  *  *  they  tsvice  fired  into  that  detachment  (3d  Battalion 
Headquarters  and  group  of  B  Company),  killing  and  wounding 
quite  a  number  of  men.     •     *     ♦     All  the  tanks  shortly  there- 


24  BLANC   MOKT. 

after  left  the  field.  *  *  *  During  the  course  of  the  foUo'n'ing 
afternoon  (October  S),  with  the  consent  of  the  commanding 
officer,  141st  Infantry,  the  tanks  were  withdrawn  entirely  from 
action. 

The  141st  Infantry  had  a  hard  time  on  October  8,  but 
^_History,  36th  ^j^g  I42d  had  a  harder.  To  begin  with,  the  company  com- 
manders did  not  receive  their  orders  until  about  5  a.  m. — 
too  late  to  allow  them  to  digest  the  orders  properly  and 
transmit  them  to  their  companies.  Consequently  the 
advance  was  from  5  to  15  minutes  late  in  starting,  which 
largely  nullified  the  effects  of  the  artillery  barrage. 
History,  3cth  The  2d  Battalion  advancing  northwest  fought  its  way 
past  Hill  160.  After  it  had  overcome  the  German  resist- 
ance on  the  Hill  160  ridge,  the  principal  obstacle  to  the 
battalion's  advance  was  the  cemetery  at  the  northeastern 
corner  of  St.  Etienne,  which  was  a  mass  of  machine-gun 
nests  dug  among  and  through  the  graves,  and  which  had 
a  field  of  fire  of  from  500  to  1,000  meters  through  an  arc 
of  180  degrees  from  southwest  to  northeast.  Parts  of  the 
battalion  finally  arrived  on  the  St.  Etienne-Semide  road 
about  1  kilometer  northeast  of  St.  Etienne.  Here  it  was 
joined  by  portions  of  the  other  battalions  and  a  line  was 
established  which  seems  to  have  extended  from  the  north- 
eastern corner  of  St.  Etienne,  through  the  cemetery  to- 
ward Semide.  Here  the  troops  dug  in.  The  left  of  the 
line  was  secured  at  first  by  the  French  7th  Division, 
infor.  Off.  7th  whose  line  at  10.20  a.  m.  was  northwest  of  St.  Etienne, 
and  later  on  by  the  occupation  of  the  town  by  American 
troops.  But  the  right  was  absolutely  uncovered,  as  a  gap 
of  more  than  2  kilometers  existed  between  the  142d  and 
141st  Infantry  Eegiments,  and,  moreover,  the  latter's 
most  advanced  elements  were  more  than  a  kilometer  in 
Op.  Rpt.,  4th  I'ear.  This  fact,  and  the  disorganization  of  the  troops, 
^^'  caused  the  Avithdrawal  of  the  142d  Infantry  during  the 

late  afternoon  to  the  ridge  through  Hill  160.     Commu- 
nication with  the  French  7th  Division  was  established 
through  the  American  troops  in  and  north  of  St.  Etienne, 
•    but  connection  with  the  141st  Infantry  was  not  obtained 
until  the  next  day. 
HiBtoiy,    36th      The  tanks  attached  to  the  142d  Infantry  rendered  no 
^^'  more  service  than  those  with  the  141st  Infantry.     The 

tank  commander  was  killed  early  in  the  morning  while 
the  infantry  was  attacking  Hill  160,  and  one  tank  dis- 
abled.   The  others  then  withdrew. 


BLANC   MONT. 


25 


St.  Etiennc  itself  does  not  seem  to  have  caused  much 
difficulty  during  the  fighting  on  October  8.    A  platoon  piJ^'^^^'y-    ^^^^ 
of  Company  I,  142d  Infantry,  is  reported  to  have  entered 
the  town   during   the   morning,   established    connection 
with  the  French,  "  who  were  found  there  in  light  force," 
and  to  have  remained  there  the  remainder  of  the  day.  ^^Pp-  ^p*-  ^"^^ 
A   patrol   of  the    142d   Infantry   probably   entered   St. 
Etienne,  but  the  town  can  not  be  said  to  have  been  in  j^^fj^-  "p*-  *^^ 
American  possession  until  about  11  a.  m.,  when  the  1st 
Battalion,  Otli  Alarines,  which  was  designated  for  liaison  Brig!^to^&-3. 
duty  on  the  left  of  the  71st  Brigade,  entered  the  town 
Avithout  difficulty.     Two  of  the  companies  of  this  bat- 
talion attempted  to  occupy  trenches  to  the  north  of  the 
town,  but  were  unable  to  do  so,  whereupon  they  fell  back 
on  the  other  two  companies  and  occupied  trenches  to 
the  south,  connecting  with  the  7th  French  Division.    At  piJ,"^°^-  q^s/*^ 
4.40  p.  m.  the  American  line  included  St.  Etienne.    The  ^.^p-  ^pt..  36th 
evening  of  October  8,  a  battalion  of  the  2d  Engineers  ^.^p-  i^p'-  2d 
reinforced  the  Marine  battalion. 

The  71st  Brigade  had  been  roughly  handled  in  its  first  „4PP,^"'^3'6t*h 
active  service.  Its  losses  from  all  causes — killed,  i^'v. 
wounded,  missing,  and  gassed — amounted  to  75  officers 
and  1,314  enlisted  men,  a  percentage  of  33  for  officers 
and  23  for  enlisted.  These  losses  were  high,  and  ap- 
peared higher.  Exaggeration  of  losses  always  occurs 
especially  in  new  troops,  and  this  action  was  no  excep- 
tion.   At  8.45  a.  m.  a  message  from  the  71st  Brigade  to  „¥^fs?i   "|* 

°  -^    .      Bng.  to  O.  of  S. 

G-3  states  that  the  losses  had  been  50  per  cent.     This 
and  other  discouraging  reports  caused  considerable  ap- 
prehension as  to  the  safety  of  the  right  flank  of  the  71st    Message,  g-3  to 
Brigade,  and  the  brigade  commander  requested  that  the  2ist  corps. 
72d  Brigade  and  131st  Machine  Gun  Battalion  be  ordered 
to  reinforce  him.     Gen.  Lejeune  repeated  this  request 
to  the  21st  Corps,  at  the  same  time  telling  Gen.  Whit-  ^vwu^rth."*  *" 
worth  that  he  had  ordered  Gen.  Ely  to  put  in  everything 
he  had.    In  the  meantime  the  71st  Brigade  had  stopped 
advancing,  and  as  the  Germans  did  not  counter  attack, 
reinforcements  were  unnecessary. 

The  failure  of  the  71st  Brigade  is  not  fully  explained 
by  its  heavy  losses.    The  chief  of  staff  of  the  3Gth  Divi-     statement   of 
sion  states  that  the  failure  of  the  attack  was  largely  due  1620°.      *    ^  " 
to  the  fact  that  the  line  of  departure  was  given  as. the 
St.  Etienne-Orfeuil  road,  whereas  the  true  line  was  gen- 
erally some  distance  in  rear  of  that  road;  the  artillery 


26  BLANC   MONT. 

barrage  thus  left  untouched  the  advanced  German  ma- 
chine-gun groups,  which  were  able  to  oppose  and  dis- 
organize the  advance  of  the  Tlst  Brigade  from  the  very 
beginning  of  the  attack. 

The  sketch  referred  to  in  the  Artillery  Annex  to  Field 
Order  No.  40,  2d  Division,  shows  that  the  barrage  came 
down  on  a  line  between  300  and  400  meters  north  of  the 
St.  Etienne-Orfeuil  road.  The  irregular  front  line  of 
the  Tlst  Brigade,  while  it  followed  the  general  line  of 
this  road,  departed  from  it  in  places  by  several  hundred 
meters,  and  was  in  advance  of  it  only  in  the  left  of  the 
sector.  It  is  therefore  certain  that  a  strip  several  hun- 
dred meters  wide  in  front  of  the  Tlst  Brigade  was  un- 
touched by  the  barrage  and  the  events  of  the  battle  indi- 
cate that  the  Germans  had  machine  guns  in  this  area. 
Such  a  situation  was  not  uncommon  during  the  war,  and 
was  usually  met  by  withdrawing  the  troops  from  the 
front  line  before  an  attack  in  order  to  allow  the  barrage 
to  cover  doubtful  territory.  Had  this  been  done,  the  bar^ 
rage  could  have  been  placed  as  far  south  of  where  it 
actually  fell  as  desired.  Why  this  was  not  done  it  is 
impossible  to  say,  except  that  haste  seems  to  have  char- 
acterized this  whole  attack. 

The  front  line  of  the  Tlst  Brigade  on  the  night  of 
October  8-9  ran  generally  east  and  west  from  a  point 
about  2  kilometers  northwest  of  Medeah  Farm  to  the 
western  slope  of  Hill  160.  In  the  sector  of  the  141st 
Infantry  it  was  parallel  to  the  St.  Etienne-Orfeuil  road 
and  about  400  meters  north  of  it.  In  that  of  the  142d 
Infantry  it  was  bent  to  the  north  around  Hill  160.  The 
line  was  held  by  provisional  organizations  composed  of 
such  men  as  could  be  assembled.  It  was  not  continuous 
and  the  two  infantry  regiments  were  not  in  communica- 
tion. The  battalion  of  the  2d  Engineers  maintained 
communication  with  the  T3d  French  Division  on  the  right, 
and  a  battalion  of  the  6th  Marines,  reinforced  by  a 
battalion  of  the  2d  Engineers,  held  St.  Etienne  and  the 
cemetery  and  were  in  communication  with  the  French  Tth 
Division.  The  line  was  supported  by  the  infantry  of  the 
2d  Division  on  Blanc  Mont-Medeah  Farm  ridge. 
Instructions,      Instructions  received  by  the  commander  of  the  Tlst 

2d    Div.    to    Tlst  ^        ,  ■  ■  •  i>       i  • 

Brig.,  Oct.  9.  Brigade  early  on  October  9  directed  him  to  rectify  his 
line  and  organize  it  in  depth;  to  maintain  contact  with 
the  enemy  and  adjacent  divisions;  to  reconnoiter  tlie 
trench  system  800  meters  north  of  St.  Etienne  and  to 


BLANC   MONT. 


27 


take  it  over  if  unoccupied  and  to  prepare  to  attack  it  at 
10  a.  m.  if  occupied;  to  prepare  to  take  over  entire  sector 
of  2d  Division,  which  was  to  be  withdrawn  on  the  night 
of  October  9-10. 

The  71st  Brigade,  however,  was  in  no  condition  to  dj"'"'"''^'    ^°''' 
attack.    It  devoted  the  day  to  the  reorganization  of  its  ^.^p-  ^p*-  ^eth 
troops,  who  were  stretched  across  the  divisional  sector  ^^^p-  ^p'-  ^d 
in  a  single  line  without  either  supports  or  reserves  ex- 
cept those  furnished  by  the  2d  Division.    There  was  no 
mixing  of  regiments,  but  within  each  regimental  sector 
battalions,  companies,  and  platoons  had  lost  all  signs 
of  organization.     Provisional  units  were   formed,  and 
were  placed  so  as  to  fill  up  gaps  in  the  line,  rectify  it,  and 
secure  communication  with  adjacent  units. 

The  line  of  the  142d  Infantry  had  been  erroneously  ^.^p-  ^vt,  36th 
reported  as  in  rear  of  that  of  the  141st  Infantry,  In 
order  to  correct  this  a  provisional  battalion  of  the  142d  pi"/''''''*'  ^^^^ 
Infantry,  accompanied  by  a  platoon  of  Stokes  mortars 
and  one  of  machine  guns,  attempted  to  advance  toward 
St.  Etienne  about  11.30  a.  m.,  but  did  not  get  far  beyond 
the  crest  of  the  Hill  160  ridge.  Here  it  took  shelter  and 
waited  until  night,  when  it  returned  to  Hill  160.  This 
was  the  only  offensive  operation  during  the  day. 

There  was  no  change  in  the  position  of  the  71st  Bri- 
gade's line  on  October  9.  A  battalion  of  the  2d  Engi- 
neers still  was  connecting  the  141st  Infantry  with  the  g^^Mes^^^^g^_  coi. 
French  73d  Division  on  the  right.  On  the  left,  however, 
the  battalion  of  the  6th  Marines  had  occupied  the  div/*^*"^^' 
trenches  700  meters  north  of  St.  Etienne.  This  left 
flank  information  group,  composed  of  Marines  and  Engi- 
neers, was  relieved  the  night  of  October  9-10  and  on 
October  10  by  detachments  of  the  142d  Infantry  taken 
from  Hill  160.  The  front  line  of  the  36th  Division  then 
included  St.  Etienne  and  the  cemetery,  two  points  that 
had  given  so  much  trouble  to  both  French  and  Americans. 

The  Fourth  French  Army  "  Order  of  the  day,"  for    4th  Army  staff, 
October  9,  stated  that  the  fraction  of  the  36th  Division 
north  of  Suippes  (the  part  not  already  engaged)   was 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  21st  Corps,  and  that  it 
would  relieve  the  2d  Division  except  artillery.    On  Octo- 
ber 8  the  commanding  general,  21st  Corps,  directed  the     s.  o.  s.rsi/s. 
36th  Division  to  relieve  the  2d  Division  the  evening  of    ^    °'^'' 
October  9, 


28  BLANC   MONT. 

F.  0.  41.  2d  The  relief  was  effected  bv  Field  Order  No.  41,  2d 
Division,  which  prescribed  that  it  should  be  completed 
before  5  a.  m.  October  10.  The  2d  Field  Artillery  Bri- 
gade, the  2d  Engineers,  and  certain  supply  and  sanitary 
units  and  materiel,  were  to  remain  with  the  36th  Divi- 
sion, and  the  machine  guns  in  the  front  line  and  support 
positions  were  to  remain  for  24  hours.  Command  was  to 
pass  to  the  36th  Division  at  10  a.  m.  October  10. 

F.  0.  5,  36th  The  36th  Division  (less  artillery,  field  signal  battalion, 
and  71st  Brigade)  at  the  time  of  receipt  of  Greneral 
Order  No.  41,  2d  Division,  was  in  the  area  Suippes- 
Souain.  The  72d  Brigade  and  the  131st  Machine  Gun 
Battalion  were  ordered  to  concentrate  during  the  day  of 
October  9  in  the  vicinity  of  Navarin  Farm  preparatory 
to  effecting  the  relief.  The  signal  battalion  was  already 
in  this  vicinity.  Thence  conducted  by  guides  from  the 
troops  to  be  relieved,  they  proceeded  at  9  p.  m.  to  their 
respective  areas. 

F.  0.  6.  sGth     The  143d  Infantry  relieved  the  3d  Brigade  in  its  sup- 
port and  reserve  positions.     The  2d  and  3d  Battalions 
^^History,    85th  ^.^j-g^g^j  ^1^^  23d  Infantry  about  2  kilometers  southeast 

Op.  Rpt.,  3d  of  St.  Etienne,  south  of  the  St.  Etienne-Orfeuil  road 
and  east  of  the  St.  Etienne-Sonmie-Py  road.  The  1st 
Battalion  took  position  near  the  road  crossing. 

The  144th  Infantry  relieved  the  4th  Brigade.  Its  1st 
Battalion  relieved  the  6th  Mariftes  southeast  of  St. 
Etienne  and  west  of  the  St.  Etienne-Somme-Py  road. 
The  2d  and  3d  Battalions  relieved  the  5th  Marines  just 
north  of  Blanc  Mont. 

History,   86th      Both  Fcgiments  stated  that  they  were  able  to  obtain 
*''■  but  little  information  from  the  troops  relieved. 

History,   86th      Companies  C  and  D,  133d  Machine  Gun  Battalion, 
were  attached  to  the  143d  Infantry,  and  Companies  A 
and  B  to  the  144th  Infantry. 
The  72d  Brigade  headquarters  were  established  about 

Op.  Rpt.,  2d  li  kilometers  southwest  of  Somme-Py,  at  the  former 
''''■•  headquarters  of  the  4th  Brigade. 

History,  36th  The  relief  was  completed  by  2.30  a.  m.  October  10, 
except  that  the  131st  Machine  Gun  Battalion  did  not 
get  into  position  until  late  the  same  morning.  Company 
B  seems  to  have  been  held  near  headquarters  of  the  71st 
Brigade,  while  Company  A  was  sent  north  of  Medeah 
Farm  as  an  information  group  on  the  right  of  the  141st 
Infantry, 


BLANC    MONT.  29 

Orders  issued  by  the  21st  French  Corps  for  October  g^^^/g  Zr^lt. 
10  contemphited  the  cleaning  up  by  the  aoth  Division  of  ^^'  -^'^  ^''"^''■ 
certain  trenches  1,200  meters  north  of  St.  Etienne.    This 
operation  was  to  commence  at  9.30  a.  m.  October  10,  and  di'v'."""^^'    '°"* 
when  the  orders  for  it  were  received  at  headquarters  of 
the  71st  Brigade  the  relief  of  the  2d  Division  had  not 
been  completed.    Thus  the  order,  if  obeyed,  would  havo 
necessitated  an  advance  and  probably  an  attack  by  the 
71st  Brigade,  and  its  commanding  general,  believing  his 
brigade   not   sufficiently    recovered   from   its   efforts   of 
November  8,  went  to  headquarters  of  the  2d  Division  and 
had  the  contemplated  attack  abandoned. 

The  command  of  the  sector  passed  from  the  2d  to  the  ^j^p-  ^p'--  ^d 
3Gth  Division  at  10  a.  m.  October  10,  and  the  36th  Divi- 
sion headquarters  was  established  at  the  former  head- 
quarters of  the  2d  Division  at  Somme-Py.  The  com- 
manding general,  2d  Division,  and  his  assistant  chief  of 
staff,  G-3,  remained  with  the  commanding  general,  3Gth 
Division,  for  24  hours  longer. 

The  2d  Division  (less  the  units  to  remain  with  the  3Gth  oi^'*'  ^^^" 
Division)*  was  assembled  near  Navarin  Farm,  whence  it 
marched  to  the  Suippes-Somme-Suippes  area.  The  3d  and  uh^Brigs.  *** 
Brigade  marched  to  billets  4  kilometers  northeast  of 
Suippes  and  the  4th  Brigade  to  the  Suippes-Nantivet- 
Somme-Suippes  area,  where  it  passed  to  the  reserve  of 
the  Fourth  Army.  The  2d  Division  machine-gun  units 
were  relieved  from  duty  with  the  36th  Division  on  Octo- 
ber 10  and  rejoined  their  division. 

The  opinion  held  by  the  French  on  the  operations  of  si" i°e'un"4'th 
the  2d  Division  in  Champagne  is  shown  by  the  following  ^''"'^'  ^'^*-  '^' 
extracts : 

Up  to  October  4,  at  which  date  the  present  bulletin  is  written, 
the  Fourth  Army  has  pushed  its  advance  up  to  the  objectives  of 
the  very  highest  importance.  A  splendid  American  division,  full 
of  dash  and  ardor,  the  2d  Division,  U.  S.,  placed  at  the  dispo- 
sition of  the  21st  Corps  on  October  3,  made  itself  master  of  Massif 
du  Blanc  Mont,  which  dominates  the  valley  of  the  Suippes  in 
rear  of  the  region  of  Monts ;  this  conquest  rapidly  brought  about 
the  downfall  of  Notre  Dame  des  Champs  and  the  Grand  Bois  de 
St.  Souplet. 

*The  units  of  the  2d  Division  which  remained  with  the  36th  Division       History,     SCth 
were  the  2d  F.  A.   Brigade,  part  of  the  2d  Ammunition  Train,   2d   Eni,'!-     '*'• 
neers,  SO  trucks  of  2d  Supply  Train,  19  water  carts,  and  certain  ordnance 
mati'rlel. 


I 


30  BLANC   MONT. 

„,  l"..*  *  '•  rJ^F^i'     The  Intelligence  Report  of  the  21st  Corps  for  October 

21st  Corps,  Oct.  6.  ^  ••■  ■•• 

6  states: 

Despite  the  flank  fire  of  extremely  numerous  machine  guns, 
artillery,  and  even  mineuwerfers,  both  on  its  right  and  left 
flanks,  the  2d  Division,  U.  S.,  was  able  to  maintain  in  toto  its 
advance,  and  thus  made  possible  the  advance  of  the  11th  Corps 
on  the  morning  of  the  5th  to  the  River  Arnes. 

Casualty    list,     The  Severity  of  the  fighting  of  the  2d  Division  is  evi- 
au  to' Op.  Rpt.  denced  by  the  following  casualty  list,  which  includes 
the  losses  October  2-10,  inclusive : 


Officers. 

Enlisted. 

Killed 

41 
6 

48 

102 

12 

685 

579 

926 

Slightly  wounded 

2,367 
207 

Gassed 

Total 

209 

4,771 

Appendix    to      The  cHvision  captured  1,963  prisoners,  including  48 

Div.        "        officers.    It  reports  the  capture  of  25  guns,  332  machine 

guns,  20  trench  mortars,  6  antitank  guns,  besides  great 

quantities  of  ammunition,  tools,  lumber,  signal  property, 

railroad  equipment,  etc. 

American      During  its  operations  near  Blanc  Mont  the  2d  Division 

wc6lflv  bittl©  or* 

der  map ;  French  was  opposcd  bv  the  200th  and  213th  German  Divisions, 

daily    battle    or-  ^  5      ,  .    ,  ,  i         ,.        i  t  i  t    • 

der  map.  botli  of  which  wcre  reported  to  be  iresh.     In  addition 

prisoners  were  reported  to  have  been  captured  from  six 
Intel.  Rpts.,  other  divisions,  but  it  is  impossible  to  ascertain  what  por- 
°^^'  tions  of  these  divisions  were  put  into  the  line.  About 
this  time  the  Germans  commenced  to  reinforce  weak 
places  by  bringing  up  whatever  troops  they  could  lay 
hands  on,  which  evidently  accounts  for  the  large  number 
of  divisions  seemingly  opposed  to  the  2d  Division  from 
October  2  to  10. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  October  10,  unmistakable 

signs  pointed  to  a  withdrawal  of  the  enemy  along  the 

Message,  s.  R.  entire  front  of  the  Fourth  Army.    In  front  of  the  21st 

F.  A.'  Brig. "       Corps  enemy  batteries  were  firing  at  long  range,  and 

batteries  previously  reported  in  the  immediate  vicinity 

Message,  c.  o.  i^cid  not  fired  for  12  hours.     French  patrols  sent  out 

121st      Art.       to  ^ 

G-3-  from  the  73d  Division  had  lost  touch  with  the  enemy 

north  of  Medeah  Farm.     Later  these  patrols  reported 

that  they  had  gone  500  meters  north  of  Bemont  Chateau 

History,    36th  witliout  eainino;  contact.    The  7th  French  Division  was 

Dlv. 

reported  to  have  advanced  3  kilometers  north  of  St. 
Etienne,  where  it  encountered  fire  from  its  right  flank. 


BLAITC   MON^T.  31 

The  assistant  chief  of  staff,  2d  Division,  informed  the  e,imy'Tn*°His! 
71st  Brigade  that  the  enemy  was  evidently  retreating  and  p°p7'iw-i92?'''' 
ordered  energetic  patrolling  to  verify  this.     During  the 
afternoon  indications  of  the  enemy's  retreat  multiplied. 
The  French  divisions  on  the  flanks  of  the  3Gth  Division 
had  passed  the  front  of  the  71st  Brigade  during  the 
morning,  but  no  general   attack  was  ordered   by   that 
brigade,  which  merely  maintained  contact.     In   doing  pj^^*^*°'"5''    ^^^^ 
this  the  provisional  units  of  the  141st  Infantry  made  a 
slight  advance  of  about  300  meters,  which  brought  ite 
front  line  to  the  unimproved  road  leading  due  east  from 
St.  Etienne,  where  they  "  dug  in."    This  operation  was 
in  the  nature  of  a  reconnaissance  in  force.     The  142d     History,   seth 

Div, 

Inf antrj'^  is  reported  to  have  sent  out  patrols  which  "  met 
with  such  heavy  enemy  fire  from  the  trenches  north  of 
St.  Etienne  *  *  *  that  no  further  advance  was  at- 
tempted, and  throughout  the  remainder  of  the  day  the 
regiment  remained  in  its  position." 

On  October  10,  the  141st  Infantry  reported  casualties  DiJ!f  p.'^2i7f^*'' 
of  6  killed  and  12  wounded,  and  the  142d  Infantry,  2 
killed  and  58  wounded. 

Orders  from  the  21st  Corps,  received  by  the  36th  Di- 
vision shortly  before  noon  on  October  10,  gave  informa- 
tion of  the  enemy's  withdrawal  and  of  the  advance  of 
the  73d  and  124th  French  Divisions  (the  center  and 
right  divisions  of  the  21st  Corps),  and  directed  the  36th 
Division  to  advance  its  lines  and  keep  abreast  of  the 
11th  Corps. 

In  compliance  with  the  corps  order,  the  36th  Division  ^^^-  o.  6,  scth 
issued  Field  Order  No.  6,  which  directed  the  advance  of 
the  36th  Division  to  a  line  even  with  the  French  divisions 
-on  its  flanks.  The  attack  was  to  be  made  at  5  p.  m. 
October  10  by  the  72d  Brigade,  regiments  abreast,  which 
was  to  pass  through  the  71st  Brigade,  143d  Infantry  on 
tlie  right  and  144th  Infantry  on  the  left,  each  regiment 
in  column  of  battalions.  After  the  passage  of  the  lines 
the  71st  Brigade  and  the  2d  Engineers  were  to  consti- 
tute the  reserve. 

Arrangements  for  artillery  support  were  made  ver-  History,  seth 
bally  with  the  commanding  officer,  2d  Field  Artillery 
Brigade,  whose  regiments,  in  view  of  uncertainty  as  to 
the  location  of  both  the  French  and  the  71st  Brigade, 
were  ordered  to  communicate  directly  with  the  infantry 
and  to  give  them  the  necessary  support. 


Dif. 


32  BIANC   MONT. 

The  above  order  (Field  Order  No.  6)  was  distributed 
and  discussed  at  division  headquarters  at  about  2  p.  m. 
October  10,  the  commanding  general,  72d  Brigade,  and 
his  regimental  and  machine  gun  battalion  commanders 
being  present. 

The  orders  of  the  commanding  general,  72d  Brigade, 
are  probably  embodied  in  Field  Order  No.  1,  72d  Bri- 
gade, no  copy  of  which  can  be  located. 

History.  86th  fhe  attack  order  of  the  commanding  officer,  143d  In- 
fantry,  assigned  the  2d  Battalion  as  the  assaulting  bat- 
talion, Companies  L  and  M  to  the  support  and  the  1st 
Battalion  to  the  reserve.  Companies  I  and  K,  and  Com- 
pany D,  133d  Machine  Gun  Battalion,  formed  the  right 
information  group  and  a  platoon  of  Company  G  plus 
two  machine  guns  the  left  detachment.  The  144th  In- 
fantry was  expected  to  furnish  like  troops  to  the  inter- 
regimental  information  group. 

History,  »oth  "Yhe  advancc  started  about  6  p.  m.,  delayed,  it  appears, 
by  artillery  fire  during  the  preparatory  arrangements 
and  by  the  distances  separating  the  troops.  But  little 
progress  was  made.  The  2d  and  3d  Battalions  soon  be- 
came intermingled  with  the  141st  Infantry  and  their 
most  advanced  elements  got  only  as  far  as  the  St.  Eti- 
enne-Scay  Farm  road,  where  they  dug  in,  thus  prolong- 
ing to  the  west  the  front  line  of  the  141st  Infantry,  which 
had  reached  that  road  during  its  reconnaissance  in  force. 
The  1st  Battalion,  in  reserve,  did  not  move.  Neither  the 
liegimental  Machine  Gun  Company  nor  Company  D, 
133d  Machine  Gun  Battalion,  participated  in  the  attack. 
Casualties  in  the  143d  Infantry  consisted  of  8  killed  and 
83  wounded. 

The  1st  Battalion,  144th  Infantry,  which  was  on  the 
southwest  slope  of  Hill  160,  had  during  the  afternoon 
of  October  10,  been  ordered  to  relieve  the  troops  of  the 
142d  Infantry  in  St.  Etienne,  and  Company  B  was  en- 
gaged in  this  operation  when  the  battalion  commander 
received  an  order  placing  his  battalion  in  reserve  for  an 
attack,  to  be  delivered  at  5  p.  m.  Company  B  was  with- 
drawn and  the  battalion  resumed  its  original  position. 
The  attack  order  of  the  commanding  officer,  144th  In- 
fantry, designated  the  2d  Battalion  plus  the  Regimental 
Machine  Gun  Company,  the  37  millimeter  guns  and 
Stokes  mortars  as  the  assaulting  battalion,  the  3d  as 
the  support  and  the  1st  as  reserve.    No  instructions  for 


BLANC   MONT.  33 

connection  with  adjacent  troops  or  for  flank  protection 
were  given. 

The  144th  Infantry  also  advanced  at  about  6  p.  m.  It 
made  no  better  progress  than  the  143d  Infantry.  Tlie 
leading  battalion  seems  to  have  reached  a  system  of  old 
German  trenches  southeast  of  St.  Etienne  from  which 
position  it  was  moved  to  the  right  in  rear  (south)  of  Hill 
160.  The  support  battalion  (3d)  conformed  to  the  move- 
ments of  the  2d,  and  morning  found  both  battalions  well 
within  the  lines  of  the  142d  Infantry.  The  reserve  bat- 
talion (1st)  did  not  move  from  its  position  on  Blanc 
Mont. 

Casualties  in  the  144th  Infantry  were  31  wounded. 

Field  Order  No.  6,  36th  Division,  directed  the  72d 
Brigade  to  pass  through  the  lines  of  the  71st  Brigade. 
There  was  no  passage  of  lines,  and  on  the  morning  of 
October  11  the  71st  Brigade  was  still  holding  the  front 
line  of  the  division  sector,  and  the  72d  Brigade  was  in 
its  rear,  except  for  detachments  of  the  143d  Infantry, 
who  were  along  the  Scay  Farm-St.  Etienne  road  between 
the  141st  and  142d  regiments. 

At  5  p.  m.  October  10  the  21st  Corps  issued  Operation  3g^8P;3  ^2itt 
Order  No.  3.806/3,  which  gave  the  information  that  the  ^«^p^ 
enemy  was  withdrawing  along  the  entire  corps  front 
and  directed  an  energetic  pursuit  toward  Attigny.    The  . 
36th  Division  was  directed  to  conform  to  the  movements 
of  the  73d  Di%dsion,  which  was  reported  to  have  advanced 
to    the    north    edge    of    the    woods    north    of    Bemont 
Chateau. 

The  above  order  was  received  at  division  headquarters 
some  time  during  the  evening  of  October  10,  and  upon  it 
was  based  Field  Order  No.  7,  which  was  issued  at  11.30  .,,^-  o.  7,  seth 

Div. 

p.  m.,  and  was  almost  identical  with  Field  Order  No.  6, 
except  that  it  assigned  objectives.  H  hour  was  9.30 
a.  m.,  October  11. 

In  compliance  with  Field  Order  No.  7,  the  72d  Brigade  di""*°'^'  ^"^'^ 
advanced  the  morning  of  October  11  from  its  position  of 
the  night  before.  The  144th  Infantry  (whose  1st  Bat- 
talion had  relieved  the  mixed  troops  of  the  142d  Infantry 
in  St.  Etienne  early  on  October  11)  seems  to  have  started 
on  time,  but  the  143d  Infantry  did  not  start  until  some 
time  after  H  hour,  thus  leaving  uncovered  the  left  flank 
of  the  73d  French  Division  and  the  right  flank  of  the 
144th  Infantry.    However,  there  was  practically  no  op- 


34  BLANC   MONT. 

position  on  either  the  French  or  American  front  and  the 
attack  ordered  by  Field  Order  No.  7  became  an  easy  but 
very  slow  pursuit.  Upon  arriving  at  the  second  objective 
named  in  Field  Order  No.  7,  line  Machault-Semide,  the 
troops  halted  and  bivouacked  for  the  night.  The  144th 
Infantry  had  lost  3  killed  and  26  wounded  during  the 
day  and  the  143d  Infantry  1  killed  and  70  "  wounded 
or  gassed." 

The  front  line  of  the  36th  Division  had  been  advanced 
4  kilometers.  Why  the  72d  Brigade  halted  on  the  second 
objective  does  not  appear,  but  it  may  be  because  the 
French  divisions  on  its  flanks  halted  also,  although  some- 
what in  advance  of  the  36th  Division. 

The  71st  Brigade  did  not  move  on  October  11,  but 
devoted  the  day  to  reorganizing  and  supplying  its  still 
intermingled  troops. 

Op.  Order,  21st  Corps  ordcrs  for  October  12  directed  the  resumption 
of  the  pursuit,  the  day's  objective  being  the  heights 
Chardeny-Vaux.  The  36th  Division  objective  included 
Yaux  and  Hill  167  to  the  northwest  thereof. 

F.  0.  8,  36th      The  36th  Division  orders  directed  the  72d  Brigade  to 

DlV.  .  >T  -n    • 

continue  the  pursuit,  with  the  71st  Brigade  and  131st 
Machine  Gun  Battalion  following  in  reserve  at  4  kilo- 
meters.   H  hour  was  6  a.  m. 

^  R  o.  2,  72d  Field  Order  No.  2,  72d  Brigade,  directed  the  brigade 
to  advance  with  its  units  in  the  same  relative  position  in 
which  they  had  halted  for  the  night,  and  emphasized 
connection  with  the  adjoining  French  divisions  which 
were  in  advance  of  the  72d  Brigade. 

Pursuant  to  the  above  orders,  the  advance  was  re- 
sumed at  6  a.  m.  October  12  by  the  144th  Infantrj'-.  The 
143d  Infantry,  not  having  received  its  orders,  was  slow 
in  starting,  but  took  up  the  march,  as  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  leading  battalion  understood  that  he  was  to 
advance  the  morning  of  the  12th,  in  connection  with 
adjacent  troops.  Little  opposition  was  encountered,  the 
casualties  for  the  day  in  the  brigade  being  9  killed  and 
58  wounded.  The  brigade  halted  late  in  the  afternoon 
and  established  outposts  just  north  of  Hill  167.  Com- 
munication with  the  adjacent  French  divisions,  the  73d 
Order,  21st  and  7th,  was  maintained  during  the  advance.     Both  of 

orps,  .  r/  .  ^j^ggg  (divisions,  in  compliance  with  a  corps  order  issued 
at  1.30  a.  m.  October  12,  passed  beyond  the  day's  objec- 
tive and  reached  the  canal  which  parallels  the  Aisne 
River  on  its  south  bank. 


BLANC   MONT.  35 

The  71st  Brigade  bivouacked  the  night  of  October  11-  ^^^p-  ^p*-  ^^^^ 
12  1^  kilometers  southeast  of  Dricourt. 

The  corps  operation  order  for  October  13  directed  that 
the  south  bank  of  the  Aisne  be  cleared  of  the  enemy 
and  that  arrangements  be  made  to  cross  the  river.    Dur-  ^  ^p-  ^o^^^'l^^^ 

^  Corps,   3831/3. 

ing  the  night  October  13-14  the  124th  French  Division 
was  to  be  relieved,  the  73d  Division  was  to  talte  over  its 
front,  and  the  36th  Division  was  to  extend  its  line  to  the 
right  to  take  over  the  sector  of  the  73d  Division  to  in- 
clude the  Briqueterie,  1,000  meters  east  of  Attigny. 

The  72d  Brigade  was  given  the  task  of  reconnoitering  |,iv;  ^'  ''  ^^^^ 
to  the  river,  clearing  the  south  shore,  and  in  case  the 
north  bank  was  not  strongly  held,  of  establishing  bridge- 
heads.   The  71st  Brigade  was  to  make  arrangements  to 
take  over  the  left  of  the  73d  Division's  sector. 

Complying  with  Field  Order  9,  the  1st  Battalion,  niv/**""^^' 
143d  Infantry,  advanced  to  the  canal  during  the  late 
morning  of  October  13,  its  right  resting  on  Attigny. 
The  1st  Battalion,  144th  Infantry,  also  advanced  to  the 
canal  and  dug  in,  its  left  resting  on  Givry.  The  3d 
Battalion  followed  the  1st  and  was  also  near  Givry.-"'  ^^.^p-  Rpt-.  seth 
The  remainder  of  the  brigade  was  distributed  in  depth 
between  the  canal  and  the  line  of  resistance,  which  was 
on  the  heights  south  of  Attigny. 

The  above- described  movements  drew  fire  from  the 
north  bank  of  the  Aisne  and  the  brigade's  casualties  for 
the  day  were  29  killed  and  207  wounded,  most  of  them 
being  in  the  144th  Infantry.  This  and  other  signs  indi- 
cated that  the  Germans  intended  to  make  a  stand  on  the 
Aisne. 

During  the  night  of  October  13-14  the  71st  Brigade    f.  o.  lo,  seth 
took  over  the  front  of  the  124th  French  Division  to  include     iiistory,    seth 

.    .  Div« 

the  Briqueterie,  and  the  troops  in  the  divisional  sector 
were  rearranged  so  that  tlie  infantry  brigades  were  side  by 
side,  71st  on  the  right  and  the  72d  on  the  left.  From 
right  to  left  the  regiments  held  the  line  as  follows :  141st, 
142d,  143d,  144th.  The  sector  from  front  to  rear  was 
divided  into  three  zones — outpost,  support,  and  reserve 
zones.  Each  regiment  had  a  battalion  in  the  outpost 
zone  (which  extended  from  the  river  to  the  line  of  resist- 
ance on  Hill  167),  and  a  battalion  and  a  machine-gun 
company  in  regimental  reserve.     Each  brigade  had  a 

•The  History  of  the  36th  Division  states  that  the  advance  of  the  144th   Infantry   to 
the  caual  was  without  authority  from  cither  brigade  or  division  coinmander. 


36  BLANC   MONT. 

battalion  and  a  machine-gun  company  in  brigade  reserve 

and  the  division  reserve  consisted  of  a  battalion  and  a 
machine-gun  company  from  each  brigade  and  the  131st 
Machine  Gun  Battalion.  The  ground  between  the  river 
and  the  heights  was  held  lightly,  the  bulk  of  the  troops 
being  held  in  rear  of  the  line  of  resistance.  The  division 
reserve  was  located  near  Dricourt. 

A  light  regiment  of  the  2d  Field  Artillery  Brigade 
supported  each  brigade  and  the  heavy  regiment  the  entire 
divisional  sector. 

The  divisional  front  line  after  the  above  dispositions 
were  completed  extended  from  the  Briqueterie,  inclusive 
(1  kilometer  east  of  Attigny),  to  Givry,  inclusive. 

The  rearrangement  of  the  troops  of  the  36th  Division 
was  completed  by  daylight  October  14,  except  that  con- 
siderable confusion  existed  in  the  144th  Infantry,  whose 
1st  and  3d  Battalions  were  near  Givry,  and  this  regiment 
was  not  in  its  proper  position  until  the  night  of  October 
15-16. 

The  period  from  October  14  to  October  26  was  one  of 
comparative  inactivity  in  the  sector  of  the  36th  Division 
and  resembled  the  former  trench  warfare.  The  division 
took  advantage  of  the  suspension  of  operations  to  re- 
equip  its  troops,  police  the  battle  fields  near  St.  Etienne, 
and  bury  its  dead.  Patrolling  went  on  constantly  and 
exposure  always  drew  fire  from  the  north  bank  of  the 
Aisne.  Possible  crossing  places  were  reconnoitered  and 
preparations  were  made  to  cross  the  river  when  the  ad- 
vance should  be  resumed. 
History.  36th  Effective  noon  October  18,  the  headquarters  and  corps 
F.  o.  11,  36th  troops  of  the  21st  Corps  were  withdrawn  from  the 
Fourth  Army  for  operations  elsewhere.  The  36th  Divi- 
sion became  the  right  division  of  the  11th  Corps,  and  the 
73d  French  Division  became  the  left  division  of  the  9th 
Corps.  These  reassignraents  made  no  change  in  the 
front  occupied  by  the  36th  Division  except  to  shift  the 
eastern  boundary  slightly  to  the  east. 
Messages,   8      On  the  night  October  20-21  the  7th  French  Division 

and  9,  G-3,  SGlh  •    ,    i  <•  it  i     •  i 

Div.,  Oct.  18.      was  Withdrawn  from  the  line  and  its  sector  was  taken 

History,      36th  ,  i         ,,^  t-.  i  i    ^/,   i        a  •  t^-     •    • 

Div.  over  by  the  61st  l*  rench  and  36th  American  Divisions. 

Div.  "  To  accomplish  this  both  of  the  brigades  of  the  36th 
Division  extended  their  areas  to  the  west,  the  71st  Bri- 
gade taking  over  a  portion  of  the  area  of  the  72d  Brigade 
and  the  latter  taking  over  a  portion  of  the  area  of  the  7th 
French  Division.    After  the  change  was  made,  the  west- 


BLANC    MONT.  37 

ern  boundary  of  the  3Gtli  Division  ran  approximately 
north  and  south  just  east  of  the  villages  of  Ambly-Haut 
and  Floury. 

The  36th  Division  was  again  shifted  the  night  of  Diy.'  ^'  ^"'  '"^^ 
October  22-23.     The  73d  French   Division  was  with- 
drawn from  the  line,  the  36th  Division  took  over  its  area,  oi"''**"^'    ^^^ 
and  the  61st  French  Division  took  over  the  front  of  the  dit.^"  ^^*''  ^^^ 
36th  Division  to  Givry,  exclusive.    This  change  practi- 
cally reestablished  the  former  western  boundary  of  the 
36th  Division.     The  eastern  boundary,  after  the  shift, 
was    Voncq    ( exclusive) -Coegny-Chardeny-Quilly    (all 
inclusive).     In  making  the  change  the  regiments  were 
also  shifted  in  line  and  occupied  the  sector  in  the  follow- 
ing order  from  right  to  left:  142d,  141st,  144th,  143d. 
The  53d  French  Division  was  on  the  right  of  the  36th. 

This  last  shift  to  the  east  brought  the  7lst  Brigade 
opposite  a  horseshoe  bend  in  the  Aisne,  3  kilometers  east 
of  Attigny.  This  bend  was  formed  by  a  swing  of  the 
river  to  the  north  and  was  3  kilometers  broad  at  the 
base  and  about  the  same  distance  in  depth.  The  ground 
within  the  loop  was  higher  than  the  country  to  the  south, 
and  itself  was  dominated  by  the  hills  to  the  north  and 
east  of  the  river.  The  Germans,  in  their  withdrawal 
across  the  river,  had  not  relinquished  the  ground  within 
this  loop,  but  had  constructed  a  trench  across  its  base 
which  was  protected  by  several  belts  of  wire  and  by  ^  ^  ^  ^^^^ 
strong  points.     The  French  73d  Division  attacked  this  ^iv- 

P    ^  Op.    Order  50, 

position  unsuccessfully  on  October  16  and  17;  it  was  ii^^  co'^p^- 
known  as  the  Forest  Farm  position  by  reason  of  a 
farm  situated  near  the  base  of  the  loop.  On  October  23 
the  36th  Division  was  directed  to  prepare  a  plan  for  tlie 
reduction  of  this  position,  and  on  October  24  orders  from 
the  11th  Corps  directed  the  division  to  take  the  position 
before  February  27,  and  assigned  additional  artillery  for 
that  purpose. 

On  the  same  day,  October  24,  a  corps  order  directed  u^'t^rp^  °°" 
the  relief  of  the  36th  Division  bj^  the  61st  and  22d  French 
Divisions  the  nights  of  October  26-27  and  27-28.    When 
it  was  decided  to  attack  the  Forest  Farm  position  on     op.  order  «i. 

^  11th   Corps. 

October  27,  the  relief  of  the  attacking  units,  two  battal- 
ions, was  postponed  until  the  night  October  28-29,  while 
the  2d  Field  Artillery  Brigade's  relief  was  postponed 
until  the  night  October  27-28. 


38  BIANC   MONT. 

p.F-  0.  13,  36th      T]^e  actual  relief  was  accomplished  as  follows : 

mstory.    36th      "^^^^  ^^g^^*  ^^  Octobcr  26-27  the  143d  Infantry  was  re- 
Div.  lieved  by  the  61st  French  Division  and  marched  to  the 

vicinity  of  St.  Marie-a-Py.  The  same  division  relieved 
the  144th  Infantry  the  night  of  October  27-28,  and  the 
regiment  marched  to  Machault.  The  reserve  battalions 
of  the  71st  Brigade,  the  1st  of  the  142d  Infantry  and  the 
3d  of  the  141st,  were  relieved  by  the  22d  French  Division 
the  same  night  and  marched  to  Somme-Py. 

The  support  battalions  of  the  71st  Brigade,  the  1st  of 
the  141st  Infantry  and  the  2d  of  the  142d  Infantry,  each 
having  two  platoons  of  the  132d  Machine  Gun  Battalion, 
were  relieved  the  night  of  October  28-29  by  the  22d 
French  Division  and  marched  to  the  S'omme-Py  area. 

The  relief  of  the  reserve  and  support  battalions  of  the 
7lst  Brigade  was  not  effected  until  after  the  success  of 
the  attack  upon  Forest  Farm  had  been  assured. 
F.  0.  14,  86th      Xhe  capture  of  the  Forest  Farm  position  was  assigned 
to  the  71st  Brigade,  supported  by  the  2d  Field  Artillery 
Brigade  and  the  artillery  of  the  9th  and  11th  Corps  and 
the  61st  and  53d  Divisions. 
Hd"^  Art    Ko'      ^^  ^^  ^^^  clear  just  what  French  artillery  actually  par- 
2026.'  ticipated  in  this  operation.     The  orders  drawn  up  by 

the  commander  of  the  artillery  of  the  11th  Corps,  who 
had  been  loaned  to  the  36th  Division  to  coordinate  the 
action  of  the  French  artillery,  specify  the  duties  to  be 
performed  by  the  artillery  of  the  9th  Corps,  the  heavy 
artillery  of  "the  Army  Corps"  (the  11th)  and  by  the 
artillery  of  the  61st  Division.  H  hour  was  at  4.30  p.  m. 
October  27.  The  artillery  preparation  commenced  20 
minutes  earlier  and  was  directed  on  the  German  posi- 
tions within  the  bend  in  the  river,  and  upon  the  batteries 
located  north  of  the  river  within  the  sector  Semuy- 
Givry.  Its  effectiveness  was  such  that  the  infantry  ad- 
vanced to  the  objective  with  almost  no  casualties. 
F.  0.  6,  71st  The  infantry  attack  was  made  by  the  two  regiments  of 
^"^.'  the  71st  Brigade  abreast,  the  142d  on  the  right  and  the 

^^History,      t   ^^^^  ^^  ^^^^  j^^^    Each  regiment  had  a  company  of  the 

132d  Machine  Gun  Battalion  attached,  and  was  formed 
in  three  lines  with  a  battalion  as  attacking  unit,  one  in 
support,  and  one  in  reserve.  The  attacking  battalions,  3d 
of  the  142d  Infantry  and  2d  of  the  141st  Infantry,  each 
had  attached  a  platoon  of  machine  guns  and  in  addition 
Company  D,  141st  Infantry,  was  attached  to  the  assault- 
ing battalion  of  its  regiment. 


BLANC   MONT.  39 

The  parallel  of  departure  followed  the  road  from  the 
Briqueterie  to  lloche.  The  line  held  by  the  71st  Brigade 
was  generally  in  advance  of  this  road,  and  was  with- 
drawn thereto  the  night  of  October  2G-27.  Promptly  at 
H  hour  on  October  27,  the  infantry  advanced,  following  ^.op.  Rpt.,  seth 
the  barrage  which  drove  the  Germans  to  their  dugouts 
and  kept  them  there  until  they  surrendered.  Within  an 
hour  the  troops  Avere  on  the  objective,  a  line  running 
southeast  through  Forest  Farm,  with  a  loss  of  but  11 
killed  and  36  wounded.  One  hundred  and  ninety-four 
prisoners  were  captured. 

The  support  battalions,  1st  of  the  lllst  Infantry  and 
2d  of  the  142d,  were  used  as  information  groups  and  to 
clean  up  in  rear  of  the  attacking  battalions.  The  reserve 
battalions  did  not  participate  in  the  fight  at  all. 

The  command  of  the  36th  Division  sector  passed  to  .,I^\^^q^^  '*• 
the  22d  French  Division  at  8  a.  m.  October  28.  At  this 
time  all  of  the  organizations  of  the  36th  Division  had 
been  relieved  except  the  troops  occupying  the  captured 
Forest  Farm  position  and  the  two  battalions  supporting 
them.  The  latter  were  relieved  the  night  of  October  28- 
29.  The  former  remained  in  position  until  between  3 
and  5  a.  m.  October  29,  when  they  were  relieved  by  the 
22d  French  Division  and  proceeded,  some  by  truck  and 
some  by  marching,  to  the  camps  near  Somme-Suippes, 
where  the  remainder  of  the  division  had  preceded  them. 
The  2d  Field  Artillery  Brigade  and  the  2d  Engineers  re- 
joined their  division  in  the  Argonne. 

The  contrast  between  the  first  and  last  operations  of 
the  36th  Division  is  great.  The  former  were  character- 
ized by  orders  hastily  given  and  transmitted,  imperfectly 
understood,  and  consequently  poorly  executed.  The  lat- 
ter operation  was  carefully  planned  and  the  orders  were 
so  given  as  to  allow  them  to  reach  and  be  understood  by 
the  troops  who  were  to  execute  them.  The  result  was 
almost  a  bloodless  victory.  To  be  sure  the  troops  had 
been  seasoned  by  over  two  weeks'  experience  in  what 
approximated  to  sector  warfare,  but  that  alone  would  not 
account  for  the  difference.  Had  the  attack  of  October 
8  been  as  thoroughly  planned  and  prepared  as  that  of 
October  27  it  would  have  stood  a  chance  of  success  even 
with  inexperienced  troops,  remembering  that  the  Ger- 
mans were  in  retreat  when  the  36th  Division  entered 
the  line. 


40 


BLANC   MONT. 


American 

•weekly  battle  or- 
d  er  maps; 
French  daily 
battle  order 
maps. 


History, 
Div. 


Durinc^  its  operations,  October  6-28,  the  36tli  Division 
■was  opposed  by  the  17th  and  213th  German  Divisions, 
the  former  reported  as  "  tired  "  and  the  latter  as  "  fresh." 
Besides  the  above,  reports  indicate  that  parts,  at  least,  of 
the  195th,  242d,  and  239th  Divisions  were  in  line,  but  it 
is  impossible  to  verify  this.  They  were  probably  there, 
as  the  Germans  were  then  throwing  into  line  whatever 
troops  they  could  lay  their  hands  on. 
scth  ^i-^Q  casualties  of  the  36th  Division  while  in  line  Octo- 
ber 6-28  were  as  follows : 


Killo'l .... 
Wovmdcd. 
Missing... 
Gassed 


Total. 


Officers. 


35 


122 


Enlisted. 


486 
1,450 


427 


2,443 


s.  o.   458/3.      Qn  October  28  the  36th  Division  was  transferred  to 

Army.       '        the  First  American  Army  and  ordered  to  proceed  to  the 

Dampierre-le-Chateau  area,  there  to  await  orders.    The 

movement  was  made  by  marching  on  October  30  and  31. 

F.  0.  95,  1st  There  the  division  passed  into  the  reserve  of  the  First 

Army  and  was  attached  to  the  1st  Corps. 


ORGANIZATION  OF  DIVISIONS  (OCTOBER.  1918). 


2D  DIVISION. 

Commanding  general: 

Maj.  Gen.  J.  A.  Lej^une,  U.  S.  M.  G. 
Chief  of  staff : 

Col  J.  C.  Rhea,  G.  S. 
G-1: 

Lieut.  CoJ.  Hugh  IMatthews. 
G-2: 

Maj.  R.  S.  Keyser. 
C-3: 

C(A.  H.  B.  Myers. 
3d  Infantry  Brigade : 

Brig.  Geu.  H.  E.  Ely. 
9th  Infantry: 

Col.  G.  W.  Stuart 
23d  Infantry : 

Col.  E.  R.  Stone. 
5th  Machine  Gun  Battalion : 
Maj.  H.  T.  Lewis. 
4th  Infantry  Brigade: 

Brig.  Gen.  W.  C.  Neville. 
5th  Marines : 

Col.  Logan  Feland. 
6th  Marines: 

Col.  Harry  Lee. 
6th  Machine  Gun  Battalion: 
Maj.  L.  W.  T.  Waller,  jr. 
2d  Field  Artillery  Brigade : 
Brig.  Gen.  A.  J.  Bowley. 
12th  Field  Artillery: 

Lieut.  Col.  J.  A.  Holabird. 
15th  Field  Artillery: 
Col.  J.  R.  Davis. 
17th  Field  Artillery: 

Lieut.  Col.  L.  C.  Sparks. 
4th    (Divisional)    Machine   Gun   Bat- 
talion : 

Maj.  A.  D.  Bruce. 
1st  Field  Signal  Battalion: 
Maj.  Charles  Murphy. 
2d  Engineers : 

Col.  W.  A.  MitchelL 


36TH  DIVISION. 

Commanding  general : 

Maj.  Gen.  W.  R.  Smith. 
Chief  of  staff: 

Col.  E.  J.  Williams,  G.  S. 
G-1: 

Col.  W.  G.  Sills  (Oct.  12-25). 
Lieut.  Col.  C.  W.  Neal,  F.  A. 
G-2: 

Lieut.  Col.  C.  H.  Mason,  G.  S. 
G-3: 

Lieut.  Col.  J.  A.  Atkins,  G.  S. 
71st  Infantry  Brigade: 

Brig.  Gen.  Pegram  Whitworth. 
141st  Infantry : 

Col.  W.  E.  Jaclfson. 
Lieut.  Col.  L.  R.  James  (com- 
manding after  Oct.  19). 
142d  Infantry: 

Col.  A.  W.  Bloor. 
132d  Machine  Gun  Battalion: 
Maj.  P.  A.  Weatherred   (com- 
manding until  Oct.  21). 
Capt.    S.    D,    Redings     (com- 
manding after  Oct.  21). 
72d  Infantry  Brigade : 

Brig.  Gen.  J.  A.  Hulen. 
143d  Infantry: 

Col.  J.  S.  Hoover   (command- 
ing until  Oct.  18). 
Lieut.    Col.    I,    J.    Phillipson 
(commanding  after  Oct.  18). 
144th  Infantry: 

Col.  J.  S.   Parker   (command- 
ing until  Oct.  14). 
Lieut.     Col.     O.     E.     Roberta 
(commanding  after  Oct.  14). 
133d  Machine  Gun  Battalion : 
Maj.  L.  S.  Davidson. 
13lRt   (Divisional)   Machine  Gun  Bat- 
talion : 

Maj.  Ellis  Stephenson. 

lUth  Field  Signal  Battalion: 

Maj.  G.  A.  Robinson. 

41 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


1.  Correspondence,  G.  H.  Q.  of  the  A.  J5.  F. 
Field  Orders,  1st  Army,  1918. 

(Filed  in  G-3  records,  A.  B.  F.,  Washington.) 

2.  Operation  Report,  2d  Division,  period  Sept.  15  to  Oct.  9,  1918, 
Field  Orders,  2d  Division,  1918. 

Operation  Report,  3d  Infantry  Brigade. 

Operation  Report,  4th  Infantry  Brigade. 

File  of  messages,  Headquarters  2d  Division,  Oct.  2  to  Oct.  9,  1918i» 

History  of  23d  Infantry. 

Field  Orders,  Sd  Infantry  Brigade,  1918. 

(Filed  in  Historical  Branch,  W.  V.  D.,  G.  S.) 

3.  Field  Orders,  33th  Division. 

History  of  the  36th  Division  and  Appendices. 
Operation  Report,  36th  Division. 
Field  Orders,  71st  Infantry  Brigade. 
Field  Orders,  72d  Infantry  Brigade. 

(Filed  in  Historical  Branch,  W.  P.  D.,  G.  S.) 

4.  French  Documents : 

Group  of  Armies  of  the  Center. 
Fourth  Army. 
Twenty-first  Corps. 
Eleventh  Corps. 

(Filed  in  Historical  Branch,  W.  P.  D.,  G.  S.) 

5.  American  and  French  Battle  Order  Maps. 

(Filed  in  G-2  records,  A.  E.  F.,  Washington.) 
42 

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